On Whose Door to Knock? Organized Interests’ Strategic Pursuit of Access to Members of Congress
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300499 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Ryan Miller (0000-0002-8091-1861, Vanderbilt University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 157-192 |
| Publication date | 2022-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12328 |
| OpenAlex | W3125840693 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 17 |
| References cited | 65 |
Organized interests routinely seek direct contacts with, or access to, members of Congress to advance their policy goals. While studies often explore the tactics interests use to obtain access, few examine interests’ strategic considerations in choosing which members to target. Furthermore, the few empirical studies that examine organized interests’ targeting strategies yield inconclusive results concerning the types of members interests target. This article presents a conjoint experiment with federal lobbyists and policy advocates—a novel experimental sample in political science—to evaluate which types of members organized interests target when trying to advance a proposal in an empirical framework that addresses some of the inferential challenges faced by prior studies. The results indicate that organized interests target members who are undecided on or are weak supporters of the proposal of interest and who possess institutional roles providing them with influence over the proposal at its current stage of the legislative process
Empirical research · Law and economics · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Process (computing · Public relations · Sample (material · Sociology · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
Strange Bedfellows, No Thanks! A Survey Experiment on the Choice of Lobbying Coalition Partners in Policy Agenda Setting
Preferential abstention in conjoint experiments
Invitation Letters Increase Response Rates in Elite Surveys
Empirical approaches to the study of access
The strategic allocation of PAC funds to effective legislators
When Do Interest Groups Lobby Legislators in Strong Presidential Systems
Descriptive representation on K street
Presidential Messages on Legislation and the Congressional Targets of Lobbying
Persuasive lobbying and the value of connections
Access to Proposers and Influence in Collective Policy Making
Does Lobbying Affect Bill Advancement? Evidence from Three State Legislatures
Politicians Support (and Voters Reward) Intra-Party Reforms to Promote Transparency
Fight or flight
How Lobbying Matters
Friendly Lobbying under Time Pressure
Polarization and the Ties That Bind
The President Will See Whom Now? Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests
Gaining access
Lobbying and Influence
Congressmen's Voting Decisions
Lobbying and Policy Change
Committees in Congress
Basic Interests
Setting the Agenda
Information and Legislative Organization
Personal Roots of Representation
Outside Lobbying
The Business of America is Lobbying
White-Collar Government
Revolving Door Lobbying
Constituency Representation in Congress
Revolving Door Lobbyists
Generalizability of heterogeneous treatment effect estimates across samples
PAC Contributions, Lobbying, and Representation
Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
The Art of Lobbying
Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics
A theoretical foundation for assessing principal-agent problems in lobbying ethics and an empirical test
Citizen and lobbyist access to Members of Congress
Agency problems and interest representation
Congress, The Electoral Connection
U. S. Congressman as Enterprise
Generalizing from Survey Experiments Conducted on Mechanical Turk
The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee
Lobbyists as Gatekeepers
Money in Exile
Understanding the Party Brand
Revolving Door Lobbyists and the Value of Congressional Staff Connections
Targeted Issue Advertising and Legislative Strategy
Do Local Party Chairs Think Women and Minority Candidates Can Win? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment
What Happens After the Alarm? Interest Group Subsidies to Legislative Overseers
PAC Contributions and Lobbying Contacts in Congressional Committees
Getting to Know You and Getting Your Vote
Getting a High Heel in the Door
Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis
Does Conjoint Analysis Mitigate Social Desirability Bias
Testing Theories of American Politics
Good Theories Deserve Good Data
Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting
How Do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees
When Are Agenda Setters Valuable
Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators
Who You Know versus What You Know
Preaching to the Choir
Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites
Racial Inequality in Democratic Accountability
Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials
Do Politicians Racially Discriminate Against Constituents? A Field Experiment on State Legislators
How Politicians Discount the Opinions of Constituents with Whom They Disagree
Counteractive Lobbying
"The Multiple Ambiguities of "Counteractive Lobbying
The Logic of the Survey Experiment Reexamined
Rethinking Representation
Strategic Legislative Subsidies
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Buying Time
How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
| Unique citing works | 17 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,4 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 17 |