Who You Know versus What You Know
The Uses of Government Experience for Washington Lobbyists
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231602 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert H Salisbury, Paul Johnson (0000-0003-3342-3504), John P Heinz (0000-0002-1344-2591), Edward O Laumann, Robert L Nelson |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 175 |
| Publication date | 1989-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2111258 |
| OpenAlex | W2332238225 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 33 |
| References cited | 3 |
Private interest representatives in Washington are often said to exploit prior experience with the federal government, especially their contacts with officials, to gain advantage for their client groups. Data on 776 interest representatives are examined to estimate the frequency and institutional location of prior governmental experience. Just over half of the respondents had had some such service; twice as many in the executive branch as in the milieu of Capitol Hill. For those with experience, the extent and character of its advantages for their work as lobbyists are assessed. In general, representatives assign greater value to the knowledge gained of both substantive policy and decision-making processes than to contacts with officials or other lobbyists
Business · Character (mathematics · Computer security · Executive branch · Exploit · Government (linguistics · Interest group · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Service (business · Value (mathematics · Work (physics · Engineering · Law · Marketing · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
The American Congress
Revolving Door Lobbyists
Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process
Why Government Spending Grows
Perpetuating Advantage
State Attorneys General, Revolving Doors and the Market for Regulatory Compliance
When the Courtiers Return to the Marble Palace
Who walks through the revolving door? Examining the lobbying activity of former members of Congress
Policy uncertainty and demand for revolving-door lobbyists
Echo chamber? Lobbying at the failed Chilean constitutional convention
How many lobbyists are in Washington? Shadow lobbying and the gray market for policy advocacy
Revolving door lobbyists and interest representation
The Revolving Door in Judicial Politics
The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle
Think tanks in politically embedded knowledge regimes
Parliament as a steppingstone? Patterns of post-parliamentary careers in The Netherlands between 1967 and 2017
Revolving doors in Europe
The Revolving Door and Access to the European Commission
Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in Washington
Expanding Organizational Advocacy Capacity
Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress
Data, Data, Data, Drowning in Data
Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change
Lobbying in the New Millennium
Lester Milbrath’s The Washington Lobbyists, 50 Years On
Campaign Contributions and Access to Congressional Offices
On Whose Door to Knock? Organized Interests’ Strategic Pursuit of Access to Members of Congress
From the Halls of Congress to K Street
The revolving door in Brussels
Life After the Bundestag
Negative Lobbying and Policy Outcomes
Financial and Economic Crisis
The Political Mobilization of Firms and Industries
| Unique citing works | 33 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,87 |
| Citation span | 1988 - 2026 (39) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 33 |