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Seok‐ju Cho

Biographic Data

ID4372007
NAMESeok‐ju Cho
GIVEN NAMESSeok‐ju
FAMILY NAMECho
SIGNATURECHO S J
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS2
WORKS AS AUTHOR1
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2009
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2009
H-INDEX1
  • Retrospective Voting and Political Representation

    Open Access•Seok‐ju Cho, Seokju Cho•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 15

    This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single‐member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well‐behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll‐call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representati…

  • Retrospective Voting and Political Representation

    Open Access•Seok‐ju Cho, Seokju Cho•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 15

    This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single‐member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well‐behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll‐call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representati…

  • Retrospective Voting and Political Representation

    Open Access•Seok‐ju Cho, Seokju Cho•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 15

    This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single‐member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well‐behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll‐call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representati…

Economics (1 work) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (1 work) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (1 work) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (1 work) · Law (1 work) · Law (1 work) · Legislation (1 work) · Legislator (1 work) · Legislature (1 work) · Majority rule (1 work)

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