Retrospective Voting and Political Representation

Bibliographic Data

ID6230101
AuthorsSeok‐ju Cho, Seokju Cho (0000-0001-6417-0517, Yale University, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume53
Issue2
Pages276-291
Publication date2009-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00370.x
OpenAlexW2085962104
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited18

This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single‐member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well‐behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll‐call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representation with respect to representatives' behavior in each district. However, with respect to representation of the social majority, my findings are indeterminate. On the one hand, there exists an equilibrium in which the majority‐preferred alternative is the outcome guaranteed, except in very special circumstances. On the other hand, this equilibrium is not generally the unique equilibrium, and, for some parameter values, there is an equilibrium in which the majority‐preferred alternative is less likely than the alternative preferred only by the minority to be the outcome

Economics · Legislation · Legislator · Legislature · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Preference · Representation (politics · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law