Seokju Cho
Biographic Data
| ID | 4411759 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Seokju Cho |
| GIVEN NAMES | Seokju |
| FAMILY NAME | Cho |
| SIGNATURE | CHO S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6417-0517 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Flip-flopping and valence in two-candidate competition
We develop a game-theoretic model of two-candidate elections in which voters are concerned with the consistency of candidates’ political positions as well as their valence characteristics unrelated to policy positions. We examine two versions of the model: One in which candidates aim to maximize their vote shares and the other in which they seek to maximize their probability of winning amid valence uncertainty. In the game with vote motivation, a…
Open primaries and crossover voting
We examine strategic voting in open primary elections by developing a Poisson voting game. In the model, two parties simultaneously hold primary elections, with two candidates competing in each party. Each voter chooses to vote for one of the four candidates without knowing how many other voters participate in each primary. Analyzing the model, we investigate what types of strategic crossover voting occur in equilibrium and under what circumstanc…
Three-party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation
Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation
This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in m…
Retrospective Voting and Political Representation
This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single‐member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well‐behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll‐call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representati…
Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation
This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in m…
Open primaries and crossover voting
We examine strategic voting in open primary elections by developing a Poisson voting game. In the model, two parties simultaneously hold primary elections, with two candidates competing in each party. Each voter chooses to vote for one of the four candidates without knowing how many other voters participate in each primary. Analyzing the model, we investigate what types of strategic crossover voting occur in equilibrium and under what circumstanc…
Three-party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation
Retrospective Voting and Political Representation
This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single‐member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well‐behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll‐call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representati…
Retrospective Voting and Political Representation
This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single‐member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well‐behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll‐call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representati…
Three-party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation
Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation
This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in m…
Open primaries and crossover voting
We examine strategic voting in open primary elections by developing a Poisson voting game. In the model, two parties simultaneously hold primary elections, with two candidates competing in each party. Each voter chooses to vote for one of the four candidates without knowing how many other voters participate in each primary. Analyzing the model, we investigate what types of strategic crossover voting occur in equilibrium and under what circumstanc…
Flip-flopping and valence in two-candidate competition
We develop a game-theoretic model of two-candidate elections in which voters are concerned with the consistency of candidates’ political positions as well as their valence characteristics unrelated to policy positions. We examine two versions of the model: One in which candidates aim to maximize their vote shares and the other in which they seek to maximize their probability of winning amid valence uncertainty. In the game with vote motivation, a…
Economics (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Voting (4 works) · Competition (biology (3 works)