Sean Farhang
Biographic Data
| ID | 4372015 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sean Farhang |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sean |
| FAMILY NAME | Farhang |
| SIGNATURE | FARHANG S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 81 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Race, gender, and party in EEOC cases, 1996–2006: Assessing the role of judge attributes in case outcomes in the US district courts
We study the relationship between trial judge attributes and monetary outcomes in cases brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. We define an estimand, the average feature comparison (AFC), that addresses whether or not a case outcome would differ were it assigned to a judge of one type as opposed to another—here male versus female, White versus non‐White, or Republican versus Democratic appointee. We develop a framework for estima…
Legislative Capacity & Administrative Power Under Divided Polarization
Conventional wisdom holds that party polarization leads to legislative gridlock, which in turn disables congressional oversight of agencies and thus erodes their constitutional legitimacy and democratic accountability. At the root of this argument is an empirical claim that higher levels of polarization materially reduce legislative productivity as measured by the number of laws passed or the number of issues on the legislative agenda addressed b…
Politics, Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals
This Article draws on novel data and presents the results of the first empirical analysis of how potentially salient characteristics of Court of Appeals judges influence class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We find that the ideological composition of the panel (measured by the party of the appointing president) has a very strong association with certification outcomes, with all-Democratic panels having dramat…
Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law
We investigate institutional explanations for Congress's choice to fragment statutory frameworks for policy implementation. We argue that divided party government, which fuels legislative‐executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy, motivates Congress to fragment implementation power as a strategy to enhance its control over implementation. We develop a novel measure of fragmentation in policy implementation, collect data on it over the pe…
Breaking Down the State: Protestors Engaged
Recent years have seen an explosion of protest movements around the world, and academic theories are racing to catch up with them. This series aims to further our understanding of the origins, dealings, decisions, and outcomes of social movements by fostering dialogue among many traditions of thought, across European nations and across continents. All theoretical perspectives are welcome. Books in the series typically combine theory with empirica…
Legislating Incentives for Attorney Representation in Civil Rights Litigation
Congress routinely relies on private lawsuits to enforce its mandates. In this article, we investigate whether, when it does so, the details of the legislation can importantly influence the extent to which the private bar is mobilized to carry out the prosecutorial function. Using an original and novel data set based on review of archived litigation documents for cases filed in the Northern and Eastern Districts of California over the two decades…
Legislative-Executive Conflict and Private Statutory Litigation in the United States: Evidence from Labor, Civil Rights, and Environmental Law
Examining qualitative historical evidence from cases of federal regulation in the areas of labor, civil rights, and environmental policy, this article provides support for the hypothesis that divergence between legislative and executive preferences—a core and distinctive feature of the American constitutional order—creates an incentive for Congress to rely upon private lawsuits, as an alternative to administrative power, to achieve its regulatory…
The Political Development of Job Discrimination Litigation, 1963–1976
In lobbying for the job discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964, liberal civil rights advocates wanted an administrative job discrimination enforcement regime modeled on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), with no private lawsuits. Pivotal conservative Republicans, empowered by a divided Democratic Party and the filibuster in the Senate, defeated an administrative framework and provided instead for private lawsuits …
Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System
This article investigates causes of the legislative choice to mobilize private litigants to enforce statutes. It specifies the statutory mechanism, grounded in economic incentives, that Congress uses to do so, and presents a theoretical framework for understanding how certain characteristics of separation of powers structures, particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy, drive legislative production of…
The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal
In this article, we will probe two distinct historical questions. First, we explore why congressional representatives from the South, who had generally supported the Democratic Party on labor issues during the 1930s, joined with Republicans to oppose the party's pro-labor orientation in the 1940s. We also examine why the class-based union movement that mobilized so assertively after the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 became so cramped and prag…
Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making
This article assesses how the institutional context of decision making on three-judge panels of the federal Court of Appeals affects the impact that gender and race have on judicial decisions. Our central question is whether and how racial minority and women judges influence legal policy on issues thought to be of particular concern to women and minorities when serving on appellate panels which decide cases by majority rule. Proper analysis of th…
The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal
In this article, we will probe two distinct historical questions. First, we explore why congressional representatives from the South, who had generally supported the Democratic Party on labor issues during the 1930s, joined with Republicans to oppose the party's pro-labor orientation in the 1940s. We also examine why the class-based union movement that mobilized so assertively after the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 became so cramped and prag…
Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law
We investigate institutional explanations for Congress's choice to fragment statutory frameworks for policy implementation. We argue that divided party government, which fuels legislative‐executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy, motivates Congress to fragment implementation power as a strategy to enhance its control over implementation. We develop a novel measure of fragmentation in policy implementation, collect data on it over the pe…
Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System
This article investigates causes of the legislative choice to mobilize private litigants to enforce statutes. It specifies the statutory mechanism, grounded in economic incentives, that Congress uses to do so, and presents a theoretical framework for understanding how certain characteristics of separation of powers structures, particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy, drive legislative production of…
Legislative Capacity & Administrative Power Under Divided Polarization
Conventional wisdom holds that party polarization leads to legislative gridlock, which in turn disables congressional oversight of agencies and thus erodes their constitutional legitimacy and democratic accountability. At the root of this argument is an empirical claim that higher levels of polarization materially reduce legislative productivity as measured by the number of laws passed or the number of issues on the legislative agenda addressed b…
The Political Development of Job Discrimination Litigation, 1963–1976
In lobbying for the job discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964, liberal civil rights advocates wanted an administrative job discrimination enforcement regime modeled on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), with no private lawsuits. Pivotal conservative Republicans, empowered by a divided Democratic Party and the filibuster in the Senate, defeated an administrative framework and provided instead for private lawsuits …
Legislating Incentives for Attorney Representation in Civil Rights Litigation
Congress routinely relies on private lawsuits to enforce its mandates. In this article, we investigate whether, when it does so, the details of the legislation can importantly influence the extent to which the private bar is mobilized to carry out the prosecutorial function. Using an original and novel data set based on review of archived litigation documents for cases filed in the Northern and Eastern Districts of California over the two decades…
Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making
This article assesses how the institutional context of decision making on three-judge panels of the federal Court of Appeals affects the impact that gender and race have on judicial decisions. Our central question is whether and how racial minority and women judges influence legal policy on issues thought to be of particular concern to women and minorities when serving on appellate panels which decide cases by majority rule. Proper analysis of th…
The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal
In this article, we will probe two distinct historical questions. First, we explore why congressional representatives from the South, who had generally supported the Democratic Party on labor issues during the 1930s, joined with Republicans to oppose the party's pro-labor orientation in the 1940s. We also examine why the class-based union movement that mobilized so assertively after the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 became so cramped and prag…
Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System
This article investigates causes of the legislative choice to mobilize private litigants to enforce statutes. It specifies the statutory mechanism, grounded in economic incentives, that Congress uses to do so, and presents a theoretical framework for understanding how certain characteristics of separation of powers structures, particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy, drive legislative production of…
The Political Development of Job Discrimination Litigation, 1963–1976
In lobbying for the job discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964, liberal civil rights advocates wanted an administrative job discrimination enforcement regime modeled on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), with no private lawsuits. Pivotal conservative Republicans, empowered by a divided Democratic Party and the filibuster in the Senate, defeated an administrative framework and provided instead for private lawsuits …
Legislative-Executive Conflict and Private Statutory Litigation in the United States: Evidence from Labor, Civil Rights, and Environmental Law
Examining qualitative historical evidence from cases of federal regulation in the areas of labor, civil rights, and environmental policy, this article provides support for the hypothesis that divergence between legislative and executive preferences—a core and distinctive feature of the American constitutional order—creates an incentive for Congress to rely upon private lawsuits, as an alternative to administrative power, to achieve its regulatory…
Legislating Incentives for Attorney Representation in Civil Rights Litigation
Congress routinely relies on private lawsuits to enforce its mandates. In this article, we investigate whether, when it does so, the details of the legislation can importantly influence the extent to which the private bar is mobilized to carry out the prosecutorial function. Using an original and novel data set based on review of archived litigation documents for cases filed in the Northern and Eastern Districts of California over the two decades…
Breaking Down the State: Protestors Engaged
Recent years have seen an explosion of protest movements around the world, and academic theories are racing to catch up with them. This series aims to further our understanding of the origins, dealings, decisions, and outcomes of social movements by fostering dialogue among many traditions of thought, across European nations and across continents. All theoretical perspectives are welcome. Books in the series typically combine theory with empirica…
Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law
We investigate institutional explanations for Congress's choice to fragment statutory frameworks for policy implementation. We argue that divided party government, which fuels legislative‐executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy, motivates Congress to fragment implementation power as a strategy to enhance its control over implementation. We develop a novel measure of fragmentation in policy implementation, collect data on it over the pe…
Politics, Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals
This Article draws on novel data and presents the results of the first empirical analysis of how potentially salient characteristics of Court of Appeals judges influence class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We find that the ideological composition of the panel (measured by the party of the appointing president) has a very strong association with certification outcomes, with all-Democratic panels having dramat…
Legislative Capacity & Administrative Power Under Divided Polarization
Conventional wisdom holds that party polarization leads to legislative gridlock, which in turn disables congressional oversight of agencies and thus erodes their constitutional legitimacy and democratic accountability. At the root of this argument is an empirical claim that higher levels of polarization materially reduce legislative productivity as measured by the number of laws passed or the number of issues on the legislative agenda addressed b…
Race, gender, and party in EEOC cases, 1996–2006: Assessing the role of judge attributes in case outcomes in the US district courts
We study the relationship between trial judge attributes and monetary outcomes in cases brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. We define an estimand, the average feature comparison (AFC), that addresses whether or not a case outcome would differ were it assigned to a judge of one type as opposed to another—here male versus female, White versus non‐White, or Republican versus Democratic appointee. We develop a framework for estima…
Political science (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Public Administration (6 works) · Public Administration (6 works) · Democracy (5 works) · Law and economics (5 works)