Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232199 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sean Farhang (University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 821-839 |
| Publication date | 2008-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00345.x |
| OpenAlex | W2166902843 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 44 |
This article investigates causes of the legislative choice to mobilize private litigants to enforce statutes. It specifies the statutory mechanism, grounded in economic incentives, that Congress uses to do so, and presents a theoretical framework for understanding how certain characteristics of separation of powers structures, particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy, drive legislative production of this mechanism. Using new and original historical data, the article presents the first empirical model of the legislative choice to mobilize private litigants, covering the years 1887 to 2004. The findings provide robust support for the proposition that interbranch conflict between Congress and the president is a powerful cause of congressional enactment of incentives to mobilize private litigants. Higher risk of electoral losses by the majority party, Democratic control of Congress, and demand by issue‐oriented interest groups are also significant predictors of congressional enactment of such incentives
Bureaucracy · Control (management · Democracy · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Legislature · Management · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Separation of powers · Statute · Statutory law · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration
Democracy, Debt, and the Bench
Safety in Numbers
The vanishing boundaries between technical and political
The Criminalization of Distress
Rights, Redistribution, and the Rise of the “Litigation State”
Legislative-Executive Conflict and Private Statutory Litigation in the United States
Framed? Judicialization and the Risk of Negative Episodic Media Coverage
The Law
Studying Bureaucracy in a Diverse Democracy
Going by the book
Between the lines
American exceptionalism
Setting the Agenda
Regression Analysis of Count Data
Minority Rights, Majority Rule
Veto Bargaining
Deliberate Discretion?
Adversarial Legalism
Delegating Powers
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy
Political Institutions
Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions
Rights talk
The welfare state and equality
Pivotal Politics
Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry
Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors
Designing Judicial Review
Methodological issues in studies of air pollution and daily counts of deaths or hospital admissions
Short term effects of air pollution on health
Legislative choice of regulatory forms
Democracy by Decree
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales
Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
Partisan Polarization in Presidential Support
Lawyers' Choice
Bridging the Gap Between Congress and the Supreme Court
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,6 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |