Daniel Gibbs
Biographic Data
| ID | 4372028 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Gibbs |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Gibbs |
| SIGNATURE | GIBBS D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Kellogg Center for Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg Virginia USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3104-0294 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Longitudinal analysis of education training vouchers utilization and post-secondary education enrollment among youth experiencing foster care, 2019–2023
A model of policy timing
I study a political agency model where a reelection‐seeking politician chooses when to make policy and a voter learns about the politician's competence from its timing, substance, and outcome. It takes time for the politician to receive information about which policy is in the voter's best interest and for the effect of policy to be observed. Due to perverse electoral incentives, politicians engage in three behaviors that limit electoral accounta…
Identifying children at risk for maltreatment fatalities
Data-driven decision-making is a common approach for identifying child maltreatment. However, such strategies must be guided by ethical, equitable, and evaluative frameworks due to their potential for bias and error. This study analyzes the key features, potential challenges, and research evidence of a data-driven strategy known as Birth Match. Interviews with key informants across four states indicate that programs share features and objectives …
Individual accountability, collective decision-making
The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster
Filibusters and efforts to defeat them shape the public reputation of U.S. senators and their parties. I develop a formal model to study how senators’ concerns about their own and the opposing party’s reputation influence their behavior in the Senate. In the model, a majority and opposition party bargain over policy. Each party earns a reputation with a core primary constituency which observes legislative bargaining and forms beliefs about its pa…
The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster
Filibusters and efforts to defeat them shape the public reputation of U.S. senators and their parties. I develop a formal model to study how senators’ concerns about their own and the opposing party’s reputation influence their behavior in the Senate. In the model, a majority and opposition party bargain over policy. Each party earns a reputation with a core primary constituency which observes legislative bargaining and forms beliefs about its pa…
Individual accountability, collective decision-making
Individual accountability, collective decision-making
The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster
Filibusters and efforts to defeat them shape the public reputation of U.S. senators and their parties. I develop a formal model to study how senators’ concerns about their own and the opposing party’s reputation influence their behavior in the Senate. In the model, a majority and opposition party bargain over policy. Each party earns a reputation with a core primary constituency which observes legislative bargaining and forms beliefs about its pa…
Identifying children at risk for maltreatment fatalities
Data-driven decision-making is a common approach for identifying child maltreatment. However, such strategies must be guided by ethical, equitable, and evaluative frameworks due to their potential for bias and error. This study analyzes the key features, potential challenges, and research evidence of a data-driven strategy known as Birth Match. Interviews with key informants across four states indicate that programs share features and objectives …
Longitudinal analysis of education training vouchers utilization and post-secondary education enrollment among youth experiencing foster care, 2019–2023
A model of policy timing
I study a political agency model where a reelection‐seeking politician chooses when to make policy and a voter learns about the politician's competence from its timing, substance, and outcome. It takes time for the politician to receive information about which policy is in the voter's best interest and for the effect of policy to be observed. Due to perverse electoral incentives, politicians engage in three behaviors that limit electoral accounta…
Economics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Medicine (2 works)