Samantha Custer
Biographic Data
| ID | 4372245 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Samantha Custer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Samantha |
| FAMILY NAME | Custer |
| SIGNATURE | CUSTER S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Director of Policy Analysis AidData Williamsburg Virginia USA |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 1 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 1 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Elites, the aid curse, and Chinese development finance: A conjoint survey experiment on elites’ aid preferences in 141 low‐ and middle‐income countries
Why do elites in low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs) favor some foreign aid projects and partners over others? Research on the “aid curse” and Chinese development finance suggests elites should prefer aid that can be easily captured, with few conditionalities, regulations, or transparency requirements. We administer a conjoint survey experiment across 141 LMICs to elicit the aid preferences of elites who are uniquely close to development pol…
Elites, the aid curse, and Chinese development finance: A conjoint survey experiment on elites’ aid preferences in 141 low‐ and middle‐income countries
Why do elites in low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs) favor some foreign aid projects and partners over others? Research on the “aid curse” and Chinese development finance suggests elites should prefer aid that can be easily captured, with few conditionalities, regulations, or transparency requirements. We administer a conjoint survey experiment across 141 LMICs to elicit the aid preferences of elites who are uniquely close to development pol…
Elites, the aid curse, and Chinese development finance: A conjoint survey experiment on elites’ aid preferences in 141 low‐ and middle‐income countries
Why do elites in low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs) favor some foreign aid projects and partners over others? Research on the “aid curse” and Chinese development finance suggests elites should prefer aid that can be easily captured, with few conditionalities, regulations, or transparency requirements. We administer a conjoint survey experiment across 141 LMICs to elicit the aid preferences of elites who are uniquely close to development pol…
Aid effectiveness (1 works) · Autocracy (1 works) · Corporate governance (1 works) · Curse (1 works) · Democracy (1 works) · Developing country (1 works) · Development economics (1 works) · Economic growth (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · Finance (1 works)