Elites, the aid curse, and Chinese development finance
A conjoint survey experiment on elites’ aid preferences in 141 low‐ and middle‐income countries
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231263 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert A Blair (0000-0001-6054-1421, Arkadij Eisler Goldman Sachs Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs Brown University Providence Rhode Island USA, corresponding author), Samantha Custer (Director of Policy Analysis AidData Williamsburg Virginia USA), Philip Roessler (0000-0002-4935-6468, Professor, Department of Government William & Mary Williamsburg Virginia USA) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1519-1540 |
| Publication date | 2025-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12926 |
| OpenAlex | W4404598911 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 73 |
Why do elites in low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs) favor some foreign aid projects and partners over others? Research on the “aid curse” and Chinese development finance suggests elites should prefer aid that can be easily captured, with few conditionalities, regulations, or transparency requirements. We administer a conjoint survey experiment across 141 LMICs to elicit the aid preferences of elites who are uniquely close to development policy debates. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we find that elites favor larger over smaller projects, grants over loans, and transportation infrastructure projects over initiatives focused on civil society or tax collection capacity. But contrary to the aid curse theory, elites also prefer projects with transparent terms and labor, corruption, and environmental regulations, and are at worst indifferent towards good governance conditionalities. These preferences hold even in corrupt and autocratic countries and even among high‐level government officials who might be expected to favor “no‐strings‐attached” aid regimes
Aid effectiveness · Autocracy · Corporate governance · Curse · Democracy · Developing country · Development economics · Economic growth · Economics · Government (linguistics · Language change · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Resource curse · Sociology · Transparency (behavior · Finance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · International Development and Aid · Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare
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Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior
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| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |