Donor preferences for recipient control of international development aid
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5086844 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jack Hennessy (Monash University), D Mortimer (0000-0002-7211-6454, Monash University), Rohan Sweeney (0000-0002-3243-9523, Monash University), Maame Esi Woode (0000-0001-9138-8853, Monash University) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 384 |
| Pages | 118535 |
| Publication date | 2025-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Science & Medicine (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0277-9536 • E-ISSN: 1873-5347 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.socscimed.2025.118535 |
| PMID | 40934574 |
| OpenAlex | W4413912281 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 45 |
More than 90 % of health aid remains tied to projects that reflect donor rather than recipient priorities. This has a material impact on aid effectiveness and is inconsistent with the stated aims of development partners to 'decolonise aid' and prioritise 'locally led development'. Relatively little attention has been given to constraints that might account for this divergence between donor rhetoric and action. The present study considers whether the preferences of donor country citizens (donors) are consistent with recipient control of aid programs. Using Indonesia as the recipient country setting, we conducted a discrete choice experiment amongst 1523 Australians aged 18+ to describe donor preferences for recipient control and nine other characteristics of Australia's health aid program. We found that donors have a strong aversion to recipient control and are unwilling to cede control of either aims or implementation. Despite evidence of pervasive preference heterogeneity, we were unable to identify a class or preference 'type' with a preference for recipient control. Importantly, donor resistance to decolonisation was pervasive under experimental control for the institutional quality of recipient governments, suggesting that preferences for donor control are unlikely to reflect an attempt to compensate for political instability and government ineffectiveness in recipient countries. The implications of these findings are significant. This fundamental misalignment challenges international commitments to locally led development. For governments aiming to reflect their constituencies' preferences, emphasizing donor control over aid objectives may garner greater public support, but risks undermining international commitments to increase recipient ownership and decolonise aid
Control (management · Development aid · Economic growth · Economics · Management · Political science · International Development and Aid · Medicine · Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare · Religion, Society, and Development
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |