Steve Bai
Biographic Data
| ID | 4372384 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Steve Bai |
| GIVEN NAMES | Steve |
| FAMILY NAME | Bai |
| SIGNATURE | BAI S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Ph.D. Student, Department of Political Science Yale University, Political Science New Haven Connecticut USA |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Authoritarian cue effect of state repression
State repression in autocracies has long been assumed to elicit explicit or implicit disapproval from citizens. Recent studies suggest that authoritarian governments can garner support for repressive policies through active information manipulation or exploiting social cleavages. However, is it possible for citizens to support repression even without government manipulation? We propose the “authoritarian cue effect,” arguing that citizens’ attitu…
Loyalty Signaling, Bureaucratic Compliance, and Variation in State Repression in Authoritarian Regimes
In autocracies, why are certain bureaucrats more heavy-handed in their use of force than others during repression? In this article, we propose an incentive-compatible theory that explains the uneven compliance of bureaucrats in repressive campaigns. We argue that bureaucrats from less trusted backgrounds tend to implement repressive tasks more fervently to credibly display loyalty and bolster their career prospects. We provide evidence for our th…
Loyalty Signaling, Bureaucratic Compliance, and Variation in State Repression in Authoritarian Regimes
In autocracies, why are certain bureaucrats more heavy-handed in their use of force than others during repression? In this article, we propose an incentive-compatible theory that explains the uneven compliance of bureaucrats in repressive campaigns. We argue that bureaucrats from less trusted backgrounds tend to implement repressive tasks more fervently to credibly display loyalty and bolster their career prospects. We provide evidence for our th…
Authoritarian cue effect of state repression
State repression in autocracies has long been assumed to elicit explicit or implicit disapproval from citizens. Recent studies suggest that authoritarian governments can garner support for repressive policies through active information manipulation or exploiting social cleavages. However, is it possible for citizens to support repression even without government manipulation? We propose the “authoritarian cue effect,” arguing that citizens’ attitu…
Loyalty Signaling, Bureaucratic Compliance, and Variation in State Repression in Authoritarian Regimes
In autocracies, why are certain bureaucrats more heavy-handed in their use of force than others during repression? In this article, we propose an incentive-compatible theory that explains the uneven compliance of bureaucrats in repressive campaigns. We argue that bureaucrats from less trusted backgrounds tend to implement repressive tasks more fervently to credibly display loyalty and bolster their career prospects. We provide evidence for our th…
Authoritarian cue effect of state repression
State repression in autocracies has long been assumed to elicit explicit or implicit disapproval from citizens. Recent studies suggest that authoritarian governments can garner support for repressive policies through active information manipulation or exploiting social cleavages. However, is it possible for citizens to support repression even without government manipulation? We propose the “authoritarian cue effect,” arguing that citizens’ attitu…
Authoritarianism (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Democracy (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Psychological repression (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works)