Jochen Rehmert
Biographic Data
| ID | 4374941 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jochen Rehmert |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jochen |
| FAMILY NAME | Rehmert |
| SIGNATURE | REHMERT J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Zurich |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1225-1512 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 88 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Policy as a Bargaining Outcome: Coalition Leverage and Pledge Fulfillment
Which parties can deliver the policies that they promised? In multiparty contexts, parties must bargain to realize electoral promises. Prior work shows that parties influence policy change by using resources such as legislative seats, ministerial posts, and agenda, veto, and policing powers, while only theoretical work considers parties’ bargaining leverage from potentially changing the government. But for parties, fulfilling pledges (not increme…
Intraparty Competition, Geographic Responsiveness and Incumbent Deselection in Closed-List Proportional Representation
Closed-list proportional representation is considered to produce politicians engaged in programmatic, party-oriented behavior. Personal vote-seeking and geographic responsiveness, however, are attributed to open-list or plurality systems. In this article, I argue that the focus on interparty competition masks incentives for geographic responsiveness generated by intraparty competition for nominations. Specifically, parties’ candidate selection me…
Selecting and ranking female candidates under PR: Evidence from a two‐stage conjoint experiment with party elites
Does gender affect candidate selection and list placement under proportional representation (PR)? Existing research argues that PR systems have a positive effect on women's representation due to a more inclusive candidate selection process. However, analysing the actual process of candidate selection under PR before observing the final party list is challenging, and little is known about the preferences and strategies of party elites when selecti…
Ideological Positions and Committee Chair Appointments
Committee chairs hold crucial positions in the legislative process and can push or quell legislative initiatives. While extant studies examine the formal powers and legislative consequences of committee chairs, we know less about their appointment. We examine who ruling parties (principal) appoint to committee chairs (agent) in order to minimize the risk of policy moving away from government positions. Using data from Japan (2003–2017) on the LDP…
Coalition Inclusion Probabilities: A Party-Strategic Measure for Predicting Policy and Politics – Corrigendum
Coalition inclusion probabilities: A Party-Strategic Measure for Predicting Policy and Politics
Policy in coalition governments (a) depends on negotiations between parties that (b) continue between elections. No extant means of predicting policy—bargaining power indices, vote shares, seat shares, polling, veto players or measures of electoral competitiveness—recognizes both of these facts. We conceptualize, estimate and validate the first dynamic measure of parties’ bargaining leverage intended to predict policy and politics. We argue that …
Coordinating nominations: How to deal with an incumbent surplus after electoral reform
How do parties and candidates react to electoral system reform? While the literature on causes and consequences of electoral reforms is receiving increasing attention, we lack a systematic micro-level account on how parties and candidates adopt to changes in electoral rules and district boundaries. This paper examines the case of the Japanese Liberal Democrats to explore how the party has managed to accommodate a surplus of incumbents to a reduce…
Party Elites’ Preferences in Candidates: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment
Party elites selecting candidates are crucial for the composition of parliament. Yet, despite their pivotal position within the party, we know only little about their preferences for potential candidates and how their own backgrounds shape these preferences. This paper presents results from a conjoint experiment carried out with party delegates chosen to select the candidates for five German parties in the run-up to three state elections. Theoret…
Party membership, pre-parliamentary socialization and party cohesion
Party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers in many established democracies. Increasing numbers of parties are recruiting non-members as candidates. Yet, what are the implications of a lack of long-term party membership for party cohesion? In this paper, I argue that pre-parliamentary party membership is in fact crucial for cohesion. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Survey and voting behavior of ca. 2,000 MPs of the Ge…
Coalition Prospects and Policy Change: An Application to the Environment
In most developed democracies, parties adjust their positions to polls and public opinion. Yet, in a coalition government, the policy that emerges is often the outcome of negotiations between governing parties. We argue that the credibility of exit threats by current coalition members and the importance of outside parties for the formation of potential alternative coalitions both matter for policy adoption. Building on a new data set measuring th…
Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment
Candidate‐selection methods (CSM) crucially affect the behavior of Members of Parliament (MPs). Extant research investigates the consequentiality of the selectorate, but is neglecting the candidacy dimension of CSM. But what are the behavioral implications of minimal candidacy‐eligibility criteria (CEC)? I theorize that parties adopt closed CEC in safe districts to ensure nominating loyalist candidates, while they use open CEC in contested distri…
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity
Extant research suggests that candidate selection methods can be consequential for party unity in legislative voting. Yet thus far, only variations in the selectorate and the degree of centralization have been examined. This article argues that Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), too, have implications for party unity. I theorize that with stricter formal requirements, parties avoid adverse selection and ensure the nomination of committed candi…
Party Elites’ Preferences in Candidates: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment
Party elites selecting candidates are crucial for the composition of parliament. Yet, despite their pivotal position within the party, we know only little about their preferences for potential candidates and how their own backgrounds shape these preferences. This paper presents results from a conjoint experiment carried out with party delegates chosen to select the candidates for five German parties in the run-up to three state elections. Theoret…
Party membership, pre-parliamentary socialization and party cohesion
Party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers in many established democracies. Increasing numbers of parties are recruiting non-members as candidates. Yet, what are the implications of a lack of long-term party membership for party cohesion? In this paper, I argue that pre-parliamentary party membership is in fact crucial for cohesion. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Survey and voting behavior of ca. 2,000 MPs of the Ge…
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity
Extant research suggests that candidate selection methods can be consequential for party unity in legislative voting. Yet thus far, only variations in the selectorate and the degree of centralization have been examined. This article argues that Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), too, have implications for party unity. I theorize that with stricter formal requirements, parties avoid adverse selection and ensure the nomination of committed candi…
Coalition Prospects and Policy Change: An Application to the Environment
In most developed democracies, parties adjust their positions to polls and public opinion. Yet, in a coalition government, the policy that emerges is often the outcome of negotiations between governing parties. We argue that the credibility of exit threats by current coalition members and the importance of outside parties for the formation of potential alternative coalitions both matter for policy adoption. Building on a new data set measuring th…
Coalition inclusion probabilities: A Party-Strategic Measure for Predicting Policy and Politics
Policy in coalition governments (a) depends on negotiations between parties that (b) continue between elections. No extant means of predicting policy—bargaining power indices, vote shares, seat shares, polling, veto players or measures of electoral competitiveness—recognizes both of these facts. We conceptualize, estimate and validate the first dynamic measure of parties’ bargaining leverage intended to predict policy and politics. We argue that …
Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment
Candidate‐selection methods (CSM) crucially affect the behavior of Members of Parliament (MPs). Extant research investigates the consequentiality of the selectorate, but is neglecting the candidacy dimension of CSM. But what are the behavioral implications of minimal candidacy‐eligibility criteria (CEC)? I theorize that parties adopt closed CEC in safe districts to ensure nominating loyalist candidates, while they use open CEC in contested distri…
Selecting and ranking female candidates under PR: Evidence from a two‐stage conjoint experiment with party elites
Does gender affect candidate selection and list placement under proportional representation (PR)? Existing research argues that PR systems have a positive effect on women's representation due to a more inclusive candidate selection process. However, analysing the actual process of candidate selection under PR before observing the final party list is challenging, and little is known about the preferences and strategies of party elites when selecti…
Intraparty Competition, Geographic Responsiveness and Incumbent Deselection in Closed-List Proportional Representation
Closed-list proportional representation is considered to produce politicians engaged in programmatic, party-oriented behavior. Personal vote-seeking and geographic responsiveness, however, are attributed to open-list or plurality systems. In this article, I argue that the focus on interparty competition masks incentives for geographic responsiveness generated by intraparty competition for nominations. Specifically, parties’ candidate selection me…
Ideological Positions and Committee Chair Appointments
Committee chairs hold crucial positions in the legislative process and can push or quell legislative initiatives. While extant studies examine the formal powers and legislative consequences of committee chairs, we know less about their appointment. We examine who ruling parties (principal) appoint to committee chairs (agent) in order to minimize the risk of policy moving away from government positions. Using data from Japan (2003–2017) on the LDP…
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity
Extant research suggests that candidate selection methods can be consequential for party unity in legislative voting. Yet thus far, only variations in the selectorate and the degree of centralization have been examined. This article argues that Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), too, have implications for party unity. I theorize that with stricter formal requirements, parties avoid adverse selection and ensure the nomination of committed candi…
Coalition Prospects and Policy Change: An Application to the Environment
In most developed democracies, parties adjust their positions to polls and public opinion. Yet, in a coalition government, the policy that emerges is often the outcome of negotiations between governing parties. We argue that the credibility of exit threats by current coalition members and the importance of outside parties for the formation of potential alternative coalitions both matter for policy adoption. Building on a new data set measuring th…
Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment
Candidate‐selection methods (CSM) crucially affect the behavior of Members of Parliament (MPs). Extant research investigates the consequentiality of the selectorate, but is neglecting the candidacy dimension of CSM. But what are the behavioral implications of minimal candidacy‐eligibility criteria (CEC)? I theorize that parties adopt closed CEC in safe districts to ensure nominating loyalist candidates, while they use open CEC in contested distri…
Coordinating nominations: How to deal with an incumbent surplus after electoral reform
How do parties and candidates react to electoral system reform? While the literature on causes and consequences of electoral reforms is receiving increasing attention, we lack a systematic micro-level account on how parties and candidates adopt to changes in electoral rules and district boundaries. This paper examines the case of the Japanese Liberal Democrats to explore how the party has managed to accommodate a surplus of incumbents to a reduce…
Party Elites’ Preferences in Candidates: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment
Party elites selecting candidates are crucial for the composition of parliament. Yet, despite their pivotal position within the party, we know only little about their preferences for potential candidates and how their own backgrounds shape these preferences. This paper presents results from a conjoint experiment carried out with party delegates chosen to select the candidates for five German parties in the run-up to three state elections. Theoret…
Party membership, pre-parliamentary socialization and party cohesion
Party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers in many established democracies. Increasing numbers of parties are recruiting non-members as candidates. Yet, what are the implications of a lack of long-term party membership for party cohesion? In this paper, I argue that pre-parliamentary party membership is in fact crucial for cohesion. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Survey and voting behavior of ca. 2,000 MPs of the Ge…
Coalition Inclusion Probabilities: A Party-Strategic Measure for Predicting Policy and Politics – Corrigendum
Coalition inclusion probabilities: A Party-Strategic Measure for Predicting Policy and Politics
Policy in coalition governments (a) depends on negotiations between parties that (b) continue between elections. No extant means of predicting policy—bargaining power indices, vote shares, seat shares, polling, veto players or measures of electoral competitiveness—recognizes both of these facts. We conceptualize, estimate and validate the first dynamic measure of parties’ bargaining leverage intended to predict policy and politics. We argue that …
Ideological Positions and Committee Chair Appointments
Committee chairs hold crucial positions in the legislative process and can push or quell legislative initiatives. While extant studies examine the formal powers and legislative consequences of committee chairs, we know less about their appointment. We examine who ruling parties (principal) appoint to committee chairs (agent) in order to minimize the risk of policy moving away from government positions. Using data from Japan (2003–2017) on the LDP…
Intraparty Competition, Geographic Responsiveness and Incumbent Deselection in Closed-List Proportional Representation
Closed-list proportional representation is considered to produce politicians engaged in programmatic, party-oriented behavior. Personal vote-seeking and geographic responsiveness, however, are attributed to open-list or plurality systems. In this article, I argue that the focus on interparty competition masks incentives for geographic responsiveness generated by intraparty competition for nominations. Specifically, parties’ candidate selection me…
Selecting and ranking female candidates under PR: Evidence from a two‐stage conjoint experiment with party elites
Does gender affect candidate selection and list placement under proportional representation (PR)? Existing research argues that PR systems have a positive effect on women's representation due to a more inclusive candidate selection process. However, analysing the actual process of candidate selection under PR before observing the final party list is challenging, and little is known about the preferences and strategies of party elites when selecti…
Policy as a Bargaining Outcome: Coalition Leverage and Pledge Fulfillment
Which parties can deliver the policies that they promised? In multiparty contexts, parties must bargain to realize electoral promises. Prior work shows that parties influence policy change by using resources such as legislative seats, ministerial posts, and agenda, veto, and policing powers, while only theoretical work considers parties’ bargaining leverage from potentially changing the government. But for parties, fulfilling pledges (not increme…
Electoral Systems and Political Participation (11 works) · Political science (10 works) · Law (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Law (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Gender Politics and Representation (5 works) · Legislature (5 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (5 works) · Democracy (4 works)