Minh D Trinh
Biographic Data
| ID | 4375303 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Minh D Trinh |
| GIVEN NAMES | Minh D |
| FAMILY NAME | Trinh |
| SIGNATURE | TRINH M D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4929-2978 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 37 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Enforcing discipline in China: Countering internal misinformation with public disclosure
Governments around the world need internal discipline to ensure the implementation of policies and delivery of governance outputs, and this need is more severe in authoritarian systems that govern top-down and without bottom-up electoral pressures. Conventional wisdom suggests that autocrats rely on punishment to discipline subordinates who fail to obey orders, but we argue that public disclosure of such malfeasance can also be effective, even wh…
Do government accountability and responsiveness enhance support for property taxes? Experimental evidence from China
Vietnam in 2024
Vietnam in 2024 saw the incumbent regime overcoming both political and economic challenges. Major high-level leadership reshufflings resulted from new intensity in the anti-corruption campaign and the death of paramount leader Nguyen Phu Trong but appeared to have settled. Despite underlying vulnerability, the economy showed recovery thanks to robust exports. Domestically, the regime maintained control over elites through the anti-corruption camp…
A Warning from Above: How Authoritarian Anti-Protest Propaganda Works
When faced with unfolding protests, autocrats frequently respond with anti-protest propaganda loaded with negative narratives about protesters. Although a substantial body of literature has suggested that anti-protest propaganda can effectively alter the way the public views protests, few researchers have examined the mechanism through which propaganda negatively affects public support for protests. In this article, the authors explain the role t…
Institutional Ambiguity Enables Successful Centralization: Evidence From China and Vietnam
In authoritarian regimes, internal information distortion happens when lower-level bureaucrats who directly extract and process information from society are compelled by local officials to manipulate this information before reporting it to regime leaders at the top of the hierarchy. Autocrats may attempt to minimize distortion with centralization reforms, but they are unlikely to succeed if local officials maintain their monopoly of authority ove…
Vietnam in 2023
Vietnam experienced drastic political and economic disruptions in 2023. The anti-corruption campaign reached the very top level of government. Ongoing prosecutions and new arrests targeted the business sector. Vietnam successfully navigated an unprecedented leadership change and restored stability to the political system, emboldening the public security forces in the process. International relations were marked by successful upgrades of ties to b…
Tea Leaf Elections: Inferring Purpose for Authoritarian Elections from Postelection Responses to Defeats
The power of authoritarian elections is not unlimited. When using elections as a source of information, authoritarian regimes may not be able to collect from a single election all the information it could theoretically provide, and so they must commit to seeking only some specific signal(s) in each election. It is possible to identify the type of information each regime seeks from its elections by studying its reactions to small but unexpected de…
What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-Level Evidence from China
How does punishment of corruption help to build public support in authoritarian regimes? We outline two primary mechanisms. Instrumentally, the ability to pursue anticorruption initiatives to the end signals government capacity. Deontologically, anticorruption punishment signals moral commitments. Through a novel experiment design for mediation analysis embedded in a series of conjoint experiments conducted in China, we find individual-level evid…
How electoral integrity affects voter turnout in democracies
Does electoral integrity affect turnout? And if so, how? We analysed some variables that are closely related to electoral integrity – government actions, opposition actions, and the context in which the election is held – and find significant impact on turnout. We argue that higher turnout is often found in elections with higher electoral integrity. We tested our claims using data for over 700 elections covering 85 democracies for the 1950–2008 p…
What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-Level Evidence from China
How does punishment of corruption help to build public support in authoritarian regimes? We outline two primary mechanisms. Instrumentally, the ability to pursue anticorruption initiatives to the end signals government capacity. Deontologically, anticorruption punishment signals moral commitments. Through a novel experiment design for mediation analysis embedded in a series of conjoint experiments conducted in China, we find individual-level evid…
How electoral integrity affects voter turnout in democracies
Does electoral integrity affect turnout? And if so, how? We analysed some variables that are closely related to electoral integrity – government actions, opposition actions, and the context in which the election is held – and find significant impact on turnout. We argue that higher turnout is often found in elections with higher electoral integrity. We tested our claims using data for over 700 elections covering 85 democracies for the 1950–2008 p…
Tea Leaf Elections: Inferring Purpose for Authoritarian Elections from Postelection Responses to Defeats
The power of authoritarian elections is not unlimited. When using elections as a source of information, authoritarian regimes may not be able to collect from a single election all the information it could theoretically provide, and so they must commit to seeking only some specific signal(s) in each election. It is possible to identify the type of information each regime seeks from its elections by studying its reactions to small but unexpected de…
A Warning from Above: How Authoritarian Anti-Protest Propaganda Works
When faced with unfolding protests, autocrats frequently respond with anti-protest propaganda loaded with negative narratives about protesters. Although a substantial body of literature has suggested that anti-protest propaganda can effectively alter the way the public views protests, few researchers have examined the mechanism through which propaganda negatively affects public support for protests. In this article, the authors explain the role t…
Do government accountability and responsiveness enhance support for property taxes? Experimental evidence from China
How electoral integrity affects voter turnout in democracies
Does electoral integrity affect turnout? And if so, how? We analysed some variables that are closely related to electoral integrity – government actions, opposition actions, and the context in which the election is held – and find significant impact on turnout. We argue that higher turnout is often found in elections with higher electoral integrity. We tested our claims using data for over 700 elections covering 85 democracies for the 1950–2008 p…
Tea Leaf Elections: Inferring Purpose for Authoritarian Elections from Postelection Responses to Defeats
The power of authoritarian elections is not unlimited. When using elections as a source of information, authoritarian regimes may not be able to collect from a single election all the information it could theoretically provide, and so they must commit to seeking only some specific signal(s) in each election. It is possible to identify the type of information each regime seeks from its elections by studying its reactions to small but unexpected de…
What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-Level Evidence from China
How does punishment of corruption help to build public support in authoritarian regimes? We outline two primary mechanisms. Instrumentally, the ability to pursue anticorruption initiatives to the end signals government capacity. Deontologically, anticorruption punishment signals moral commitments. Through a novel experiment design for mediation analysis embedded in a series of conjoint experiments conducted in China, we find individual-level evid…
Vietnam in 2023
Vietnam experienced drastic political and economic disruptions in 2023. The anti-corruption campaign reached the very top level of government. Ongoing prosecutions and new arrests targeted the business sector. Vietnam successfully navigated an unprecedented leadership change and restored stability to the political system, emboldening the public security forces in the process. International relations were marked by successful upgrades of ties to b…
Do government accountability and responsiveness enhance support for property taxes? Experimental evidence from China
Vietnam in 2024
Vietnam in 2024 saw the incumbent regime overcoming both political and economic challenges. Major high-level leadership reshufflings resulted from new intensity in the anti-corruption campaign and the death of paramount leader Nguyen Phu Trong but appeared to have settled. Despite underlying vulnerability, the economy showed recovery thanks to robust exports. Domestically, the regime maintained control over elites through the anti-corruption camp…
A Warning from Above: How Authoritarian Anti-Protest Propaganda Works
When faced with unfolding protests, autocrats frequently respond with anti-protest propaganda loaded with negative narratives about protesters. Although a substantial body of literature has suggested that anti-protest propaganda can effectively alter the way the public views protests, few researchers have examined the mechanism through which propaganda negatively affects public support for protests. In this article, the authors explain the role t…
Institutional Ambiguity Enables Successful Centralization: Evidence From China and Vietnam
In authoritarian regimes, internal information distortion happens when lower-level bureaucrats who directly extract and process information from society are compelled by local officials to manipulate this information before reporting it to regime leaders at the top of the hierarchy. Autocrats may attempt to minimize distortion with centralization reforms, but they are unlikely to succeed if local officials maintain their monopoly of authority ove…
Enforcing discipline in China: Countering internal misinformation with public disclosure
Governments around the world need internal discipline to ensure the implementation of policies and delivery of governance outputs, and this need is more severe in authoritarian systems that govern top-down and without bottom-up electoral pressures. Conventional wisdom suggests that autocrats rely on punishment to discipline subordinates who fail to obey orders, but we argue that public disclosure of such malfeasance can also be effective, even wh…
Political science (7 works) · Economics (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Authoritarianism (3 works) · China (3 works) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (3 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (3 works)