Yannick Stiller
Biographic Data
| ID | 4377679 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yannick Stiller |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yannick |
| FAMILY NAME | Stiller |
| SIGNATURE | STILLER Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Salzburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1813-2506 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Trade Competitiveness, Constituency Interests, and Legislators' Attitudes Towards Trade Agreements
We argue that legislators’ trade attitudes reflect constituents’ economic interests. Concretely, we expect that legislators from districts that are highly competitive in international trade should be more supportive of trade agreements than legislators from noncompetitive districts. The strength of this relationship should be lower in multimember districts and for right‐wing legislators. Data based on surveys with 3,576 legislators from 16 Latin …
It's trade, stupid! How changes in trade competitiveness affect incumbents' electoral success
The consequences of economic globalization on electoral outcomes have recently become a prominent topic of research. We complement the emerging literature on this topic by studying whether changes in a subnational region's trade competitiveness affect the incumbent's vote share in that region. Using a novel dataset that relates subnational trade competitiveness to election results in 29 countries over a 20‐year period, we show that this is indeed…
Why do legislators rebel on trade agreements? The effect of constituencies’ economic interests
Most trade agreements are ratified with overwhelming support by legislators throughout the world. This lack of opposition is surprising given the strong distributional consequences of trade and the expectation of conventional political economy theory that parliamentary votes on trade policy should be closely contested between winners and losers of globalization. To analyze the driving forces behind legislators’ voting behavior while avoiding the …
Trade Competitiveness, Constituency Interests, and Legislators' Attitudes Towards Trade Agreements
We argue that legislators’ trade attitudes reflect constituents’ economic interests. Concretely, we expect that legislators from districts that are highly competitive in international trade should be more supportive of trade agreements than legislators from noncompetitive districts. The strength of this relationship should be lower in multimember districts and for right‐wing legislators. Data based on surveys with 3,576 legislators from 16 Latin …
Why do legislators rebel on trade agreements? The effect of constituencies’ economic interests
Most trade agreements are ratified with overwhelming support by legislators throughout the world. This lack of opposition is surprising given the strong distributional consequences of trade and the expectation of conventional political economy theory that parliamentary votes on trade policy should be closely contested between winners and losers of globalization. To analyze the driving forces behind legislators’ voting behavior while avoiding the …
It's trade, stupid! How changes in trade competitiveness affect incumbents' electoral success
The consequences of economic globalization on electoral outcomes have recently become a prominent topic of research. We complement the emerging literature on this topic by studying whether changes in a subnational region's trade competitiveness affect the incumbent's vote share in that region. Using a novel dataset that relates subnational trade competitiveness to election results in 29 countries over a 20‐year period, we show that this is indeed…
Why do legislators rebel on trade agreements? The effect of constituencies’ economic interests
Most trade agreements are ratified with overwhelming support by legislators throughout the world. This lack of opposition is surprising given the strong distributional consequences of trade and the expectation of conventional political economy theory that parliamentary votes on trade policy should be closely contested between winners and losers of globalization. To analyze the driving forces behind legislators’ voting behavior while avoiding the …
Trade Competitiveness, Constituency Interests, and Legislators' Attitudes Towards Trade Agreements
We argue that legislators’ trade attitudes reflect constituents’ economic interests. Concretely, we expect that legislators from districts that are highly competitive in international trade should be more supportive of trade agreements than legislators from noncompetitive districts. The strength of this relationship should be lower in multimember districts and for right‐wing legislators. Data based on surveys with 3,576 legislators from 16 Latin …
It's trade, stupid! How changes in trade competitiveness affect incumbents' electoral success
The consequences of economic globalization on electoral outcomes have recently become a prominent topic of research. We complement the emerging literature on this topic by studying whether changes in a subnational region's trade competitiveness affect the incumbent's vote share in that region. Using a novel dataset that relates subnational trade competitiveness to election results in 29 countries over a 20‐year period, we show that this is indeed…
Economics (3 works) · Global trade and economics (3 works) · International economics (3 works) · International trade (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Commercial policy (2 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (2 works)