Trade Competitiveness, Constituency Interests, and Legislators' Attitudes Towards Trade Agreements

Bibliographic Data

ID6301255
AuthorsAndreas Dür (0000-0001-6621-7243, University of Salzburg), Robert A Huber (0000-0001-6536-9392, University of Salzburg, corresponding author), Yannick Stiller (0000-0003-1813-2506, University of Salzburg)
Year2024
Volume49
Issue2
Pages353-382
Publication date2024-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueLegislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/lsq.12426
OpenAlexW4380046854
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited54

We argue that legislators’ trade attitudes reflect constituents’ economic interests. Concretely, we expect that legislators from districts that are highly competitive in international trade should be more supportive of trade agreements than legislators from noncompetitive districts. The strength of this relationship should be lower in multimember districts and for right‐wing legislators. Data based on surveys with 3,576 legislators from 16 Latin American countries and 48 legislative periods between 2005 and 2019 allow us to test these expectations. The surveys captured legislators’ attitudes towards trade agreements between their countries and the United States and the European Union, respectively, and the Pacific Alliance. We measure districts’ trade competitiveness with an innovative combination of household survey and trade data. The evidence supports all three expectations. The findings contribute to research on trade policymaking, public opinion towards trade, and legislator behavior

Alliance · Business · Commercial policy · Economics · International economics · International trade · Latin Americans · Legislation · Legislator · Legislature · Political science · Trade barrier · Global trade and economics · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · World Trade Organization Law

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access