Heeding to the Losers
Legislators' Trade‐Policy Preferences and Legislative Behavior
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300477 |
|---|---|
| Authors | María Victoria Murillo (0000-0001-6972-4750, Columbia University), Paulo Moreira Pinto (0000-0002-4434-2112, University of Houston, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 539-603 |
| Publication date | 2022-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12337 |
| OpenAlex | W3167462451 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 50 |
Electoral incentives affect legislators' responsiveness to voters, parties, and other stakeholders. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems with party control over nominations foster party discipline and reduce legislators' responsiveness to local constituents when at odds with the party. Yet, even under closed‐list PR regimes policymakers have incentives to respond to local interests who help advance their political careers. We illustrate this argument using evidence from a survey of Argentine legislators and a roll‐call vote on a salient export tax bill. Despite the incentives created by the electoral regime, we find that legislators' trade‐policy preferences and legislative behavior reflect the expected consequences of trade on local constituents. Our evidence suggests that catering to voters, rather than organized interests, are more likely to motivate legislators to defy their parties. These findings underscore the importance of understanding when and how catering to local constituents can affect politicians’ trade policy choices
Affect (linguistics · Argument (complex analysis · Economics · Incentive · Legislature · Microeconomics · Odds · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Representation (politics · Salient · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Whose China Shock? Partisanship, import exposure, and trade rhetoric in the US Senate
Collaborative Networks and Institutional Change
Business versus citizens
Tabling Debate
What makes a legislator promote or thwart trade liberalization in developing democracies
Representation and Delegation in Trade Policymaking
Trade Competitiveness, Constituency Interests, and Legislators' Attitudes Towards Trade Agreements
Why do legislators rebel on trade agreements? The effect of constituencies’ economic interests
American Opinion on Trade
Making Votes Count
Legislative Voting and Accountability
Privileging Industry
From the Corn Laws to Free Trade
Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil
International Trade and Political Conflict
All Frames Are Not Created Equal
What determines individual trade-policy preferences?
Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?
The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences
Prospect Theory
Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries
Can Learning Constituency Opinion Affect How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment
Winners and losers
The Symmetry between Import and Export Taxes
The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy
Competing Rhetoric Over Time
On the Limits of Framing Effects
How Legislators Respond to Localized Economic Shocks
Public Opinion and American Democracy
The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence
Understanding Interaction Models
Ambition as a micro-foundation of party loyalty
Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting
The Subnational Connection in Unitary Regimes
Quiet Influence
From House to Home
Globalization and Welfare Spending
Through a Glass and Darkly
Support for Free Trade
Sensitivity to Issue Framing on Trade Policy Preferences
Decision Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation
Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest
Alliance for Progress? Multilevel Ambition and Patterns of Cosponsorship in the Argentine House
Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting
Looking for Locals
A Bottom‐Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy
Government and Opposition in the Argentine Congress, 1989-2007
Framing Theory
Incentives to cultivate a personal vote
Local Economic Voting and the Agricultural Boom in Argentina, 2007-2015
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |