Stine Aakre
Biographic Data
| ID | 4378391 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Stine Aakre |
| GIVEN NAMES | Stine |
| FAMILY NAME | Aakre |
| SIGNATURE | AAKRE S |
| AFFILIATIONS | CICERO Center for International Climate Research |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4269-2650 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 53 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Can the Paris Agreement deliver ambitious climate cooperation? An experimental investigation of the effectiveness of pledge-and-review and targeting short-lived climate pollutants
When Does Informal Enforcement Work
We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Seco…
The political feasibility of potent enforcement in a post-Kyoto climate agreement
Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed
More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substanti…
Target-group influence and political feasibility
Political feasibility (or infeasibility) is often associated with target-group support (or opposition) of specific policy alternatives. We argue that target-groups’ capacity to influence the spectrum of politically feasible policy options tends to be higher when (1) target groups control resources needed by decision-makers, that (2) are agenda-setters and/or veto players in the decision-making process. In the 2008 revision of the European Union E…
Emission trading
We identify and explain significant differences between the compliance enforcement systems of three cap-and-trade programmes: the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the US SO2 emission trading programme and the Kyoto Protocol. Because EU-ETS’s compliance enforcement system is somewhat less potent than that of US SO2, but vastly more potent than Kyoto’s, it might be tempting to predict that EU-ETS will (1) not quite achieve the SO2…
Target-group influence and political feasibility
Political feasibility (or infeasibility) is often associated with target-group support (or opposition) of specific policy alternatives. We argue that target-groups’ capacity to influence the spectrum of politically feasible policy options tends to be higher when (1) target groups control resources needed by decision-makers, that (2) are agenda-setters and/or veto players in the decision-making process. In the 2008 revision of the European Union E…
When Does Informal Enforcement Work
We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Seco…
Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed
More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substanti…
Emission trading
We identify and explain significant differences between the compliance enforcement systems of three cap-and-trade programmes: the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the US SO2 emission trading programme and the Kyoto Protocol. Because EU-ETS’s compliance enforcement system is somewhat less potent than that of US SO2, but vastly more potent than Kyoto’s, it might be tempting to predict that EU-ETS will (1) not quite achieve the SO2…
The political feasibility of potent enforcement in a post-Kyoto climate agreement
Target-group influence and political feasibility
Political feasibility (or infeasibility) is often associated with target-group support (or opposition) of specific policy alternatives. We argue that target-groups’ capacity to influence the spectrum of politically feasible policy options tends to be higher when (1) target groups control resources needed by decision-makers, that (2) are agenda-setters and/or veto players in the decision-making process. In the 2008 revision of the European Union E…
Emission trading
We identify and explain significant differences between the compliance enforcement systems of three cap-and-trade programmes: the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the US SO2 emission trading programme and the Kyoto Protocol. Because EU-ETS’s compliance enforcement system is somewhat less potent than that of US SO2, but vastly more potent than Kyoto’s, it might be tempting to predict that EU-ETS will (1) not quite achieve the SO2…
Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed
More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substanti…
The political feasibility of potent enforcement in a post-Kyoto climate agreement
When Does Informal Enforcement Work
We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Seco…
Can the Paris Agreement deliver ambitious climate cooperation? An experimental investigation of the effectiveness of pledge-and-review and targeting short-lived climate pollutants
Economics (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Enforcement (4 works) · Greenhouse gas (4 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (3 works) · Compliance (psychology (3 works) · International economics (3 works)