When Does Informal Enforcement Work
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285197 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stine Aakre (0000-0003-4269-2650, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo, Norway), Leif Helland (0000-0003-0376-8579, BI Norwegian Business School), Jon Hovi (0000-0002-2330-7473, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo, Norway, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 1312-1340 |
| Publication date | 2016-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002714560349 |
| OpenAlex | W2009765263 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 39 |
We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Second, they indicate that compliance enforcement will boost compliance significantly in the presence of participation enforcement. Our results also add to the experimental literature on public goods provision, again in two ways. First, they reveal that previous experimental findings of enforcement boosting cooperation are valid only in settings with forced (or enforced) participation. Second, they show that subjects’ willingness to allocate costly punishment points is significantly stronger when the enforcement system permits punishment of both types of free riding than when it permits punishment of only one type
Business · Compliance (psychology · Economics · Enforcement · Free riding · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Public economics · Public good · Punishment (psychology · Work (physics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Engineering · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology · Social Psychology
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Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others
Håndhevelse og legitimitet
Does capacity increase compliance? Examining evidence from European cooperation against air pollution
Can the management school explain noncompliance with international environmental agreements
Norms, Incentives, or Deadlines? Explaining Norway’s Noncompliance with the Gothenburg Protocol
The relative effectiveness of overlapping international institutions
Vicious Cycle
Participation, ambition and compliance
International Institutions and National Policies
The New Sovereignty
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Public goods provision in an experimental environment
International Law, International Relations and Compliance
Public Goods
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
Analyzing International Environmental Regimes
Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements
Not it
Participation and Commitment in Voluntary Coalitions to Provide Public Goods
Paths to Compliance
Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy
Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy
New Directions for Experimental Work in International Relations
The Dark Side of the Future
On compliance
Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
Assessing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements
Explaining Compliance and Defection
The enforcement–exploitation trade-off in international cooperation between weak and powerful states
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms
Covenants with and without a Sword
| Citations per year | 0.9 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2016 - 2024 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |