Leif Helland
Biographic Data
| ID | 1534653 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Leif Helland |
| GIVEN NAMES | Leif |
| FAMILY NAME | Helland |
| SIGNATURE | HELLAND L |
| AFFILIATIONS | BI Norwegian Business School |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0376-8579 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
When Does Informal Enforcement Work
We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Seco…
Partisan bias, electoral volatility, and government efficiency
Electoral agency in the lab
Models of electoral agency address the levels of discipline and selection that voters can achieve in elections. The models are demanding in terms of individual belief formation and consistency of behavior. We investigate a baseline model of electoral agency in a controlled laboratory environment. This baseline model, although simple, forms the central plank of more complex electoral agency models. Our design seeks to limit the behavioral impact o…
Persistent rent extraction
Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers
Partisan conflicts and parliamentary dominance
Forsvaret 1986–2005
Hvorfor partiene favoriserer de overrepresenterte valgdistriktene Antallet stemmeberettigede per mandat varierer betydelig mellom norske valgkretser. Dette har betydning for fordelingen av goder og byrder ved politiske vedtak. Det er to forklaringer på geografisk fordelingspolitikk. I distriktsmodellen antas at små valgdistrikter etterspør store offentlige prosjekter fordi velgerne bare betaler en liten del av skatteregningen. I partimodellen er …
Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation
Bare psykologi likevel
Lobbying with conflicting interests
The costly lobbying model of Potters and van Winden is confronted with data on lobbying interactions between local assemblies and the national assembly in Norway. A total of 239 interactions are studied. Survey responses by a large number of voters and politicians, as well as registry data on fiscal standing, demographics and elections are utilised. Two of the main predictions of the costly lobbying model gain support in the data. The probability…
Minority‐Rule Budgeting under a De Facto Constructive Vote of No Confidence
A formal analysis of a possible adjustment in the present voting institutions of the Norwegian parliament is conducted. The analysis is confined to three unitary players in a minority situation. It is argued that such a set‐up represents a fairly accurate description of the present political situation in the Norwegian budget process. The proposed adjustment in the voting institutions leads to something that resembles a de facto constructive vote …
Valgdeltakelse og lokaldemokrati
Candidate competition and strategic coordination
When Does Informal Enforcement Work
We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Seco…
Partisan bias, electoral volatility, and government efficiency
Candidate competition and strategic coordination
Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation
Lobbying with conflicting interests
The costly lobbying model of Potters and van Winden is confronted with data on lobbying interactions between local assemblies and the national assembly in Norway. A total of 239 interactions are studied. Survey responses by a large number of voters and politicians, as well as registry data on fiscal standing, demographics and elections are utilised. Two of the main predictions of the costly lobbying model gain support in the data. The probability…
Minority‐Rule Budgeting under a De Facto Constructive Vote of No Confidence
A formal analysis of a possible adjustment in the present voting institutions of the Norwegian parliament is conducted. The analysis is confined to three unitary players in a minority situation. It is argued that such a set‐up represents a fairly accurate description of the present political situation in the Norwegian budget process. The proposed adjustment in the voting institutions leads to something that resembles a de facto constructive vote …
Electoral agency in the lab
Models of electoral agency address the levels of discipline and selection that voters can achieve in elections. The models are demanding in terms of individual belief formation and consistency of behavior. We investigate a baseline model of electoral agency in a controlled laboratory environment. This baseline model, although simple, forms the central plank of more complex electoral agency models. Our design seeks to limit the behavioral impact o…
Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers
Partisan conflicts and parliamentary dominance
Valgdeltakelse og lokaldemokrati
Candidate competition and strategic coordination
Minority‐Rule Budgeting under a De Facto Constructive Vote of No Confidence
A formal analysis of a possible adjustment in the present voting institutions of the Norwegian parliament is conducted. The analysis is confined to three unitary players in a minority situation. It is argued that such a set‐up represents a fairly accurate description of the present political situation in the Norwegian budget process. The proposed adjustment in the voting institutions leads to something that resembles a de facto constructive vote …
Bare psykologi likevel
Lobbying with conflicting interests
The costly lobbying model of Potters and van Winden is confronted with data on lobbying interactions between local assemblies and the national assembly in Norway. A total of 239 interactions are studied. Survey responses by a large number of voters and politicians, as well as registry data on fiscal standing, demographics and elections are utilised. Two of the main predictions of the costly lobbying model gain support in the data. The probability…
Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation
Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers
Partisan conflicts and parliamentary dominance
Forsvaret 1986–2005
Hvorfor partiene favoriserer de overrepresenterte valgdistriktene Antallet stemmeberettigede per mandat varierer betydelig mellom norske valgkretser. Dette har betydning for fordelingen av goder og byrder ved politiske vedtak. Det er to forklaringer på geografisk fordelingspolitikk. I distriktsmodellen antas at små valgdistrikter etterspør store offentlige prosjekter fordi velgerne bare betaler en liten del av skatteregningen. I partimodellen er …
Persistent rent extraction
Electoral agency in the lab
Models of electoral agency address the levels of discipline and selection that voters can achieve in elections. The models are demanding in terms of individual belief formation and consistency of behavior. We investigate a baseline model of electoral agency in a controlled laboratory environment. This baseline model, although simple, forms the central plank of more complex electoral agency models. Our design seeks to limit the behavioral impact o…
Partisan bias, electoral volatility, and government efficiency
When Does Informal Enforcement Work
We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Seco…
Political science (13 works) · Economics (10 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Norwegian (4 works)