Minority‐Rule Budgeting under a De Facto Constructive Vote of No Confidence
A Cure for the Norwegian Illness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6382002 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Leif Helland (0000-0003-0376-8579, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 391-401 |
| Publication date | 2004-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Scandinavian Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0080-6757 • E-ISSN: 1467-9477 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0080-6757.2004.00114.x |
| OpenAlex | W2067142748 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 12 |
A formal analysis of a possible adjustment in the present voting institutions of the Norwegian parliament is conducted. The analysis is confined to three unitary players in a minority situation. It is argued that such a set‐up represents a fairly accurate description of the present political situation in the Norwegian budget process. The proposed adjustment in the voting institutions leads to something that resembles a de facto constructive vote of no confidence in the budget process. Such an instrument is often said to strengthen a minority government. The formal ana‐lysis shows that the adjusted voting institution selects a Condorcet winner if such a winner exists. If, however, no such winner exists, the minority government is always defeated. The latter finding implies that if a cycle in preferences is present, the adjusted voting institution will amplify the inherent instability. This is in stark contrast to the common claim that institutions help break cycles
Cardinal voting systems · Condorcet method · Constructive · De facto · Economics · Government (linguistics · Institution · Law and economics · Majority rule · Norwegian · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Process (computing · Unitary state · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law
Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies
Information and Legislative Organization
Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy
Multiparty Government
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies
A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
Minority government and majority rule
Factions in Committees
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
| Citations per year | 0.06 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2008 - 2008 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |