Simone Burkhart
Biographic Data
| ID | 4378712 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Simone Burkhart |
| GIVEN NAMES | Simone |
| FAMILY NAME | Burkhart |
| SIGNATURE | BURKHART S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 50 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
A More Efficient and Accountable Federalism? An Analysis of the Consequences of Germany's 2006 Constitutional Reform
The German federal reform adopted in 2006 aims to enhance efficiency and\naccountability of governance by disentangling the intertwined levels of government\nand by reducing the veto rights of the Bundesrat, Germany’s strong second\nchamber. In this article, we assess the degree to which reform in these areas has\nbeen fulfilled. In particular we ask if the reform will i) accelerate the legislative\ndecision-making process, ii) expand the freedom…
Delay as a Political Technique under Divided Government? Empirical Evidence from Germany, 1976–2005
This article analyses whether the majority situation of Germany’s second\nchamber has an impact on the duration of the legislative process. While it is\noften assumed that diverging majorities between Bundestag and Bundesrat\ndelay law-making, the little empirical research that exists could not confirm\nsuch an effect of divided government. We therefore seek to discover whether\nand how an oppositional majority in the Bundesrat can credibly threa…
Between Consensus and Conflict: Law-Making Processes in Germany
Germany is routinely considered a consensus democracy.1 Its federal structure, strong bicameralism, corporatism and a powerful constitutional court demand cooperative action on the part of all acto
Legislative Self‐Restraint Under Divided Government In Germany, 1976–2002
Using the Vanberg (1998) model of legislative autolimitation from the judicial review literature, we investigated the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main prediction of the model is that a strong opposition dominance in the second chamber (Bundesrat) usually does not lead to open party‐political conflict, but rather to a government's legislative self‐restraint. We tested the hypotheses follo…
Kompromiss und Konflikt im parteipolitisierten Föderalismus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Journal of Pol itical Science (ZPol) is devoted to all areas and sub-areas of Political Science. The priority of this journal is to provide a platform for carrying on critical debates on basic, theoretical and practice-oriented political science
Legislative Self‐Restraint Under Divided Government In Germany, 1976–2002
Using the Vanberg (1998) model of legislative autolimitation from the judicial review literature, we investigated the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main prediction of the model is that a strong opposition dominance in the second chamber (Bundesrat) usually does not lead to open party‐political conflict, but rather to a government's legislative self‐restraint. We tested the hypotheses follo…
A More Efficient and Accountable Federalism? An Analysis of the Consequences of Germany's 2006 Constitutional Reform
The German federal reform adopted in 2006 aims to enhance efficiency and\naccountability of governance by disentangling the intertwined levels of government\nand by reducing the veto rights of the Bundesrat, Germany’s strong second\nchamber. In this article, we assess the degree to which reform in these areas has\nbeen fulfilled. In particular we ask if the reform will i) accelerate the legislative\ndecision-making process, ii) expand the freedom…
Delay as a Political Technique under Divided Government? Empirical Evidence from Germany, 1976–2005
This article analyses whether the majority situation of Germany’s second\nchamber has an impact on the duration of the legislative process. While it is\noften assumed that diverging majorities between Bundestag and Bundesrat\ndelay law-making, the little empirical research that exists could not confirm\nsuch an effect of divided government. We therefore seek to discover whether\nand how an oppositional majority in the Bundesrat can credibly threa…
Between Consensus and Conflict: Law-Making Processes in Germany
Germany is routinely considered a consensus democracy.1 Its federal structure, strong bicameralism, corporatism and a powerful constitutional court demand cooperative action on the part of all acto
Kompromiss und Konflikt im parteipolitisierten Föderalismus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Journal of Pol itical Science (ZPol) is devoted to all areas and sub-areas of Political Science. The priority of this journal is to provide a platform for carrying on critical debates on basic, theoretical and practice-oriented political science
Kompromiss und Konflikt im parteipolitisierten Föderalismus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Journal of Pol itical Science (ZPol) is devoted to all areas and sub-areas of Political Science. The priority of this journal is to provide a platform for carrying on critical debates on basic, theoretical and practice-oriented political science
Legislative Self‐Restraint Under Divided Government In Germany, 1976–2002
Using the Vanberg (1998) model of legislative autolimitation from the judicial review literature, we investigated the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main prediction of the model is that a strong opposition dominance in the second chamber (Bundesrat) usually does not lead to open party‐political conflict, but rather to a government's legislative self‐restraint. We tested the hypotheses follo…
A More Efficient and Accountable Federalism? An Analysis of the Consequences of Germany's 2006 Constitutional Reform
The German federal reform adopted in 2006 aims to enhance efficiency and\naccountability of governance by disentangling the intertwined levels of government\nand by reducing the veto rights of the Bundesrat, Germany’s strong second\nchamber. In this article, we assess the degree to which reform in these areas has\nbeen fulfilled. In particular we ask if the reform will i) accelerate the legislative\ndecision-making process, ii) expand the freedom…
Delay as a Political Technique under Divided Government? Empirical Evidence from Germany, 1976–2005
This article analyses whether the majority situation of Germany’s second\nchamber has an impact on the duration of the legislative process. While it is\noften assumed that diverging majorities between Bundestag and Bundesrat\ndelay law-making, the little empirical research that exists could not confirm\nsuch an effect of divided government. We therefore seek to discover whether\nand how an oppositional majority in the Bundesrat can credibly threa…
Between Consensus and Conflict: Law-Making Processes in Germany
Germany is routinely considered a consensus democracy.1 Its federal structure, strong bicameralism, corporatism and a powerful constitutional court demand cooperative action on the part of all acto
Law (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Politics (4 works) · Government (linguistics (3 works) · Legislature (3 works) · Political Systems and Governance (3 works) · Public Administration (3 works) · Public Administration (3 works) · Divided government (2 works)