Legislative Self‐Restraint Under Divided Government In Germany, 1976–2002
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6301092 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Philip Manow (0000-0002-7154-7789, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies), Simone Burkhart (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 167-191 |
| Publication date | 2007-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3162/036298007780907941 |
| OpenAlex | W2079602087 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 31 |
| References cited | 27 |
Using the Vanberg (1998) model of legislative autolimitation from the judicial review literature, we investigated the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main prediction of the model is that a strong opposition dominance in the second chamber (Bundesrat) usually does not lead to open party‐political conflict, but rather to a government's legislative self‐restraint. We tested the hypotheses following from the model on a detailed dataset comprising all legislative bills in Germany between 1976 and 2002. The results show that the main effects of divided government are, in fact, indirect and anticipatory. We conclude that when majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat diverge, the impact on legislation is substantial
Divided government · Dominance (genetics · Economics · Government (linguistics · Legislation · Legislature · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
The Institutions of Programmatic Action
Second order“-Effekte und Determinanten der individuellen Wahlentscheidung bei Landtagswahlen
Party governments, clientelistic reforms, and varying levels of political constraints
The effects of federalism reform on the legislative process in Germany
Navigating complexity
Strategic postponement of coalition policymaking in European Parliamentary democracies
Same old, same old? The return of the (not so) Grand Coalition after the 2025 German Bundestag election
Do elections set the pace? A quantitative assessment of the timing of European legislation
The Policy Power of the Westminster Parliament
Shared Rule vs Self-Rule? Bicameralism, Power-Sharing and the ‘Joint Decision Trap
Consensus by Default? Interaction of Government and Opposition Parties in the Committees of the German Bundestag
Legislative Politics in Germany
Parties on the Chain of Federalism
Veto power fosters cooperative behaviour
Not just about the ruling
Reforming Federalism in Germany
When Deliberative Theory Meets Empirical Political Science
Governments, Parliaments and Legislative Activity
Judicialization of Politics by Elected Politicians
Government Agenda-Setting and Bicameral Conflict Resolution
Bicameralism, intra-party bargaining, and the formation of party policy positions
Bicameral Lawmaking
The Unequal Distribution of Speaking Time in Parliamentary‐Party Groups
Temporal Strategies
Every Single Word
Strategic Timing? Coalition Governments and the Introduction of Controversial Legislation Throughout the Electoral Cycle
Legislating or rubber‐stamping? Assessing parliament's influence on law‐making with text reuse
Government dominance and the role of opposition in parliamentary democracies
The electoral connection in staggered parliaments
Constitutional courts as veto players
Institutional Factors and Agreement in Lawmaking
Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat
Föderalismus als dynamisches System
Bicameralism
Divided we govern
Veto Players
Democracy and the Market
The Birth of Judicial Politics in France
The presidency and the political system
Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy Compromise
The Formation of the National Party Systems
The Joint‐decision Trap
Divided We Govern? A Reassessment
Divided Government and the Passage of Partisan Legislation, 1947-1990
Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945-94
Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock
The Politics of Blame
The Legislative Impact of Divided Government
The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96
Needed
Barometer elections in comparative perspective
The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies
Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness
| Unique citing works | 31 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,72 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2026 (19) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 31 |