Iris Malone
Biographic Data
| ID | 4380387 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Iris Malone |
| GIVEN NAMES | Iris |
| FAMILY NAME | Malone |
| SIGNATURE | MALONE I |
| AFFILIATIONS | George Washington University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2487-2754 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Foreign Sponsorship of Armed Groups and Civil War
s Under what conditions do armed groups escalate their campaigns to civil war? Existing research suggests foreign states’ material support is critical to explaining armed groups' conduct during civil war and, thereby, war intensification, duration, and outcomes. Thus far, little attention has been paid to understanding whether and how foreign support influences whether armed groups fight civil wars in the first place, largely due to data limitati…
Go arm me: How militant fragmentation affects external support
Over the last 50 years, civil conflicts have grown increasingly complex due to the proliferation of new armed groups and rebel fragmentation. Yet, existing research on external support for armed groups often ignores this multi-actor dimension, overlooking the unusual amount of discretion sponsors have in deciding whom to support in any given target state. This paper explores how multi-militant conflict environments impact foreign state sponsorshi…
Militant Splinter Groups and the Use of Violence
Existing research portrays militant splinter groups as more violent than their parent organizations due to factors like more extreme preferences or capacity-building needs. Though widely held, the assumption that splinters are particularly violent has not been systematically tested. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative explanation for splinter behavior. We argue splinter groups often appear less violent than their parents due to an u…
Economic shocks and militant formation
A prominent debate in the civil war literature asks whether commodity price shocks incentivize fighting, but existing analyses find inconsistent results. This paper shows these results arise, in part, because research conflates the decision to form a militant campaign with the start of civil conflict. Using original data on 973 militant groups, I sequentially disaggregate between civil conflict onset and the earlier stage of militant mobilization…
Recurrent neural networks for conflict forecasting
Can history predict the escalation of future violence? This research note evaluates the use of a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for the Violence Early Warning System (ViEWS) Prediction Competition. Existing research on civil conflict shows violence is a persistent and recurring process, often shaping the direction of future conflicts. Building on this insight, I build a RNN model to examine how well historical patterns in conflict predict long-te…
Unmasking Militants: Organizational Trends in Armed Groups, 1970–2012
Despite the prevalence of armed groups in world politics, a prominent measurement challenge obscures understanding about many of these militant actors, especially when their activities fall below the threshold of civil war. This note addresses this gap by introducing a new dataset on the organizational characteristics of 1,202 armed groups that operated in 124 countries between 1970 and 2012. It outlines the dataset's construction and uses princi…
High valuations, uncertainty, and war
Many theories of war predict conflict becomes more likely as a state increasingly values the prize at stake. This article showcases an important limit. If—as in many cases—a state has uncertainty over its opponent’s material cost of fighting, then increasing the opponent’s valuation can decrease the probability of war. Why? Uncertainty condenses the various types’ reservation values, reducing the peace premium and incentivizing a proposer to make…
The Uncertainty Trade-off: Reexamining Opportunity Costs and War
Conventional wisdom about economic interdependence and international conflict predicts that increasing opportunity costs make war less likely, but some wars occur after costs grow. Why? We develop a model that shows that a nonmonotonic relationship exists between the costs and probability of war when there is uncertainty over resolve. Under these conditions, increasing the costs of an uninformed party's opponent has a second-order effect of exace…
The Uncertainty Trade-off: Reexamining Opportunity Costs and War
Conventional wisdom about economic interdependence and international conflict predicts that increasing opportunity costs make war less likely, but some wars occur after costs grow. Why? We develop a model that shows that a nonmonotonic relationship exists between the costs and probability of war when there is uncertainty over resolve. Under these conditions, increasing the costs of an uninformed party's opponent has a second-order effect of exace…
Unmasking Militants: Organizational Trends in Armed Groups, 1970–2012
Despite the prevalence of armed groups in world politics, a prominent measurement challenge obscures understanding about many of these militant actors, especially when their activities fall below the threshold of civil war. This note addresses this gap by introducing a new dataset on the organizational characteristics of 1,202 armed groups that operated in 124 countries between 1970 and 2012. It outlines the dataset's construction and uses princi…
Militant Splinter Groups and the Use of Violence
Existing research portrays militant splinter groups as more violent than their parent organizations due to factors like more extreme preferences or capacity-building needs. Though widely held, the assumption that splinters are particularly violent has not been systematically tested. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative explanation for splinter behavior. We argue splinter groups often appear less violent than their parents due to an u…
Go arm me: How militant fragmentation affects external support
Over the last 50 years, civil conflicts have grown increasingly complex due to the proliferation of new armed groups and rebel fragmentation. Yet, existing research on external support for armed groups often ignores this multi-actor dimension, overlooking the unusual amount of discretion sponsors have in deciding whom to support in any given target state. This paper explores how multi-militant conflict environments impact foreign state sponsorshi…
Recurrent neural networks for conflict forecasting
Can history predict the escalation of future violence? This research note evaluates the use of a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for the Violence Early Warning System (ViEWS) Prediction Competition. Existing research on civil conflict shows violence is a persistent and recurring process, often shaping the direction of future conflicts. Building on this insight, I build a RNN model to examine how well historical patterns in conflict predict long-te…
The Uncertainty Trade-off: Reexamining Opportunity Costs and War
Conventional wisdom about economic interdependence and international conflict predicts that increasing opportunity costs make war less likely, but some wars occur after costs grow. Why? We develop a model that shows that a nonmonotonic relationship exists between the costs and probability of war when there is uncertainty over resolve. Under these conditions, increasing the costs of an uninformed party's opponent has a second-order effect of exace…
High valuations, uncertainty, and war
Many theories of war predict conflict becomes more likely as a state increasingly values the prize at stake. This article showcases an important limit. If—as in many cases—a state has uncertainty over its opponent’s material cost of fighting, then increasing the opponent’s valuation can decrease the probability of war. Why? Uncertainty condenses the various types’ reservation values, reducing the peace premium and incentivizing a proposer to make…
Economic shocks and militant formation
A prominent debate in the civil war literature asks whether commodity price shocks incentivize fighting, but existing analyses find inconsistent results. This paper shows these results arise, in part, because research conflates the decision to form a militant campaign with the start of civil conflict. Using original data on 973 militant groups, I sequentially disaggregate between civil conflict onset and the earlier stage of militant mobilization…
Recurrent neural networks for conflict forecasting
Can history predict the escalation of future violence? This research note evaluates the use of a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for the Violence Early Warning System (ViEWS) Prediction Competition. Existing research on civil conflict shows violence is a persistent and recurring process, often shaping the direction of future conflicts. Building on this insight, I build a RNN model to examine how well historical patterns in conflict predict long-te…
Unmasking Militants: Organizational Trends in Armed Groups, 1970–2012
Despite the prevalence of armed groups in world politics, a prominent measurement challenge obscures understanding about many of these militant actors, especially when their activities fall below the threshold of civil war. This note addresses this gap by introducing a new dataset on the organizational characteristics of 1,202 armed groups that operated in 124 countries between 1970 and 2012. It outlines the dataset's construction and uses princi…
Go arm me: How militant fragmentation affects external support
Over the last 50 years, civil conflicts have grown increasingly complex due to the proliferation of new armed groups and rebel fragmentation. Yet, existing research on external support for armed groups often ignores this multi-actor dimension, overlooking the unusual amount of discretion sponsors have in deciding whom to support in any given target state. This paper explores how multi-militant conflict environments impact foreign state sponsorshi…
Militant Splinter Groups and the Use of Violence
Existing research portrays militant splinter groups as more violent than their parent organizations due to factors like more extreme preferences or capacity-building needs. Though widely held, the assumption that splinters are particularly violent has not been systematically tested. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative explanation for splinter behavior. We argue splinter groups often appear less violent than their parents due to an u…
Foreign Sponsorship of Armed Groups and Civil War
s Under what conditions do armed groups escalate their campaigns to civil war? Existing research suggests foreign states’ material support is critical to explaining armed groups' conduct during civil war and, thereby, war intensification, duration, and outcomes. Thus far, little attention has been paid to understanding whether and how foreign support influences whether armed groups fight civil wars in the first place, largely due to data limitati…
Political science (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Economics (5 works) · Militant (4 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Sociology (4 works)