Abigail S Post
Biographic Data
| ID | 4380556 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Abigail S Post |
| GIVEN NAMES | Abigail S |
| FAMILY NAME | Post |
| SIGNATURE | POST A S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pittsburgh |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2264-2074 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 43 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Hand-Tying through Military Signals in Crisis Bargaining
Theories of crisis bargaining suggest that costly signals can enhance the credibility of one’s coercive threats. In particular, engaging in conspicuous military mobilizations or demonstrations of force are thought to communicate one’s resolve in a crisis. Yet, there is disagreement about why this might be the case. One set of theories emphasizes the hand-tying political and reputational effects of visible military action. A different collection o…
Words Matter: The Effect of Moral Language on International Bargaining
How does moral language affect international bargaining? When countries rely on moral language to frame a disputed issue, they decrease the probability of peaceful compromise and increase the probability of the dispute escalating with military action. This language operates through two pathways. First, moral language prejudices domestic audiences against compromise over the disputed issue, thereby limiting the options available to negotiators dur…
Why can’t a woman be more like a man? Female leaders in crisis bargaining
What is the impact of gender on international affairs? In this paper, we argue that existing theories of international relations often miss the crucial role of gendered perceptions in politics. We draw on research in experimental psychology and the comparative politics of gendered leadership to understand how gender influences reactions to female foreign policy. We argue that female leaders in particular face gender stereotypes that cause dispute…
Flying to Fail: Costly Signals and Air Power in Crisis Bargaining
Theories of crisis bargaining suggest that military mobilizations act as costly signals of resolve, increasing the credibility of coercive threats. In this article, I argue that air mobilizations, as a subset of military signals, demonstrate a lack of resolve during coercive bargaining for four reasons: they cost less in terms of human and financial resources (sunk costs), generate lower political costs (hand-tying), do not raise the risks of eng…
Why can’t a woman be more like a man? Female leaders in crisis bargaining
What is the impact of gender on international affairs? In this paper, we argue that existing theories of international relations often miss the crucial role of gendered perceptions in politics. We draw on research in experimental psychology and the comparative politics of gendered leadership to understand how gender influences reactions to female foreign policy. We argue that female leaders in particular face gender stereotypes that cause dispute…
Flying to Fail: Costly Signals and Air Power in Crisis Bargaining
Theories of crisis bargaining suggest that military mobilizations act as costly signals of resolve, increasing the credibility of coercive threats. In this article, I argue that air mobilizations, as a subset of military signals, demonstrate a lack of resolve during coercive bargaining for four reasons: they cost less in terms of human and financial resources (sunk costs), generate lower political costs (hand-tying), do not raise the risks of eng…
Hand-Tying through Military Signals in Crisis Bargaining
Theories of crisis bargaining suggest that costly signals can enhance the credibility of one’s coercive threats. In particular, engaging in conspicuous military mobilizations or demonstrations of force are thought to communicate one’s resolve in a crisis. Yet, there is disagreement about why this might be the case. One set of theories emphasizes the hand-tying political and reputational effects of visible military action. A different collection o…
Words Matter: The Effect of Moral Language on International Bargaining
How does moral language affect international bargaining? When countries rely on moral language to frame a disputed issue, they decrease the probability of peaceful compromise and increase the probability of the dispute escalating with military action. This language operates through two pathways. First, moral language prejudices domestic audiences against compromise over the disputed issue, thereby limiting the options available to negotiators dur…
Why can’t a woman be more like a man? Female leaders in crisis bargaining
What is the impact of gender on international affairs? In this paper, we argue that existing theories of international relations often miss the crucial role of gendered perceptions in politics. We draw on research in experimental psychology and the comparative politics of gendered leadership to understand how gender influences reactions to female foreign policy. We argue that female leaders in particular face gender stereotypes that cause dispute…
Flying to Fail: Costly Signals and Air Power in Crisis Bargaining
Theories of crisis bargaining suggest that military mobilizations act as costly signals of resolve, increasing the credibility of coercive threats. In this article, I argue that air mobilizations, as a subset of military signals, demonstrate a lack of resolve during coercive bargaining for four reasons: they cost less in terms of human and financial resources (sunk costs), generate lower political costs (hand-tying), do not raise the risks of eng…
Words Matter: The Effect of Moral Language on International Bargaining
How does moral language affect international bargaining? When countries rely on moral language to frame a disputed issue, they decrease the probability of peaceful compromise and increase the probability of the dispute escalating with military action. This language operates through two pathways. First, moral language prejudices domestic audiences against compromise over the disputed issue, thereby limiting the options available to negotiators dur…
Hand-Tying through Military Signals in Crisis Bargaining
Theories of crisis bargaining suggest that costly signals can enhance the credibility of one’s coercive threats. In particular, engaging in conspicuous military mobilizations or demonstrations of force are thought to communicate one’s resolve in a crisis. Yet, there is disagreement about why this might be the case. One set of theories emphasizes the hand-tying political and reputational effects of visible military action. A different collection o…
Political science (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Global Peace and Security Dynamics (3 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Peacebuilding and International Security (2 works) · Political economy (2 works)