Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Flying to Fail

Costly Signals and Air Power in Crisis Bargaining

Bibliographic Data

ID6284783
AuthorsAbigail S Post (0000-0003-2264-2074, Anderson University - Indiana, corresponding author), Abigail Post (0000-0002-5660-2444, Department of History and Political Science, Anderson University, Anderson, IN, USA)
Year2019
Volume63
Issue4
Pages869-895
Publication date2019-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002718777043
OpenAlexW4233587521
LanguageEN
Citations received15
References cited56

Theories of crisis bargaining suggest that military mobilizations act as costly signals of resolve, increasing the credibility of coercive threats. In this article, I argue that air mobilizations, as a subset of military signals, demonstrate a lack of resolve during coercive bargaining for four reasons: they cost less in terms of human and financial resources (sunk costs), generate lower political costs (hand-tying), do not raise the risks of engagement (manipulation of risk), and do not significantly shift the balance of power—all compared with other military signals. Using new data that disaggregates military demonstrations into air, naval, and land signals during 210 cases of compellence, this article presents systematic evidence that air signals decrease the probability of coercive threat success compared with the alternatives. This finding holds important implications for theoretical and policy debates regarding the role of costly signals in international bargaining

Balance (ability · Bargaining power · Credibility · Economics · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Tying · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology

  • Patterns of Indirect Violence in Conventional War

    Open Access•Mikael Hiberg Naghizadeh, Seung Hoon Chae•International Studies Quarterly•2026

  • One if by Land, and Two if by Sea

    Open Access•J Andrés Gannon•International Studies Quarterly•2022

  • Air superiority and battlefield victory

    Open Access•Richard Saunders, Mark Souva•Research & Politics•2020

  • The Reputational Costs and Ethical Implications of Coercive Limited Air Strikes

    Open Access•Danielle L Lupton•Ethics & International Affairs•2020

  • Airpower and territorial control

    Open Access•Emil Petersson•Conflict Management and Peace…•2023

  • Beyond body counts

    Open Access•Gregory L Smith•Conflict Management and Peace…•2025

  • A Wiki-based dataset of military operations with novel strategic technologies (MONSTr)

    J Andrés Gannon, Kerry Chávez•International Interactions•2023

  • Politics by many other means

    Jon R Lindsay, Erik Gartzke•Journal of Strategic Studies•2022

  • Uncertainty in crisis bargaining with multiple policy options

    Open Access•Brenton Kenkel, Peter Schram•American Journal of Political…•2025

  • When Capabilities Backfire

    Peter Schram•The Journal of Politics•2022

  • Hand-Tying through Military Signals in Crisis Bargaining

    Open Access•Abigail S Post, Todd S Sechser•International Studies Quarterly•2024

  • Bureaucracy and Cyber Coercion

    Open Access•Heidi Demarest, Heidi Brockmann Demarest et al.•International Studies Quarterly•2023

  • Planes, Trains, and Armored Mobiles

    Open Access•J Andrés Gannon•International Studies Quarterly•2023

  • Normalising algorithmic warfare through visual practice

    Robin Vanderborght•Critical Studies on Security•2024

  • Sending the B team

    Open Access•Roseanne W Mcmanus, Tuba Sendinc•Journal of Peace Research•2025

  • The illogic of American nuclear strategy

    Robert Jervis•The illogic of American nuclear…•1984

  • Bombing to win

    Robert Anthony Pape•Bombing to win•1996

  • Nuclear Deterrence Theory

    Open Access•Robert Powell•Nuclear Deterrence Theory•1990

  • Military Threats

    Open Access•Branislav L Slantchev•Military Threats•2011

  • Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy

    Open Access•Kenneth A Schultz•Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy•2001

  • The logic of images in international relations.

    Robert Jervis•The logic of images in…•1970

  • A Theory of Foreign Policy

    Glenn Palmer, T Clifton Morgan•Theory of Foreign Policy•2011

  • The Correlates of War (Cow) Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3.0

    Open Access•Douglas M Stinnett, Douglas Stinnett et al.•Conflict Management and Peace…•2002

  • America's asymmetric advantage

    US AIR force MAJOR R A RENNER•Defence Studies•2004

  • The air force strikes back

    Robert A Pape•Security Studies•1997

  • Success in modern war

    John A Warden•Security Studies•1997

  • Understanding the impact of air power

    Open Access•Susan Hannah Allen, Carla Martinez Machain•Conflict Management and Peace…•2017

  • Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001

    Open Access•Todd S Sechser•Conflict Management and Peace…•2011

  • Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985

    Judith D Singer•International Interactions•1988

  • Military Mobilization and Commitment Problems

    Ahmer Tarar•International Interactions•2013

  • The Limits of Coercive Airpower

    Daniel R Lake•International Security•2009

  • Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate

    Daniel Byman, Daniel L Byman et al.•International Security•2000

  • A Clear Victory for Air Power

    Andrew L Stigler•International Security•2003

  • The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare

    Daryl G Pre, Daryl G Press•International Security•2001

  • Substitution Is in the Variance

    Open Access•David H Clark, Timothy Nordstrom et al.•American Journal of Political…•2008

  • Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816-1980

    Paul F Diehl•The Journal of Politics•1985

  • Looking for Audience Costs in all the Wrong Places

    Philip B K Potter, Matthew A Baum•The Journal of Politics•2014

  • Dangerous Dyads

    Open Access•Stuart A Bremer•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1992

  • Audience Costs, Information, and Credible Commitment Problems

    Open Access•Chungshik Moon, Mark Souva•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2016

  • The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization on the Outcome of International Crises

    Open Access•Brian Lai•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2004

  • Signaling Foreign Policy Interests

    Open Access•James D Fearon•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1997

  • When Does Aerial Bombing Work

    Open Access•Michael Horowitz, Michael C Horowitz et al.•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2001

  • Time Bombs

    Open Access•Susan Hannah Allen•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2007

  • Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests

    Open Access•James D Fearon•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1994

  • Are Soldiers Less War-Prone than Statesmen

    Open Access•Todd S Sechser•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2004

  • The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan

    Patrick B Johnston, Anoop K Sarbahi et al.•International Studies Quarterly•2016

  • Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation

    Paul Huth, Bruce Russett•International Studies Quarterly•1988

  • Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power

    Open Access•Robert Powell•International Organization•2015

  • How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders

    Open Access•Michael C Horowitz, Allan C Stam et al.•International Organization•2014

  • Rationalist explanations for war

    Open Access•James D Fearon•International Organization•1995

  • Autocratic Audience Costs

    Jessica L P Weeks, Jessica L Weeks•International Organization•2008

  • Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War

    Open Access•Kenneth A Schultz•International Organization•1999

  • The Illusion of Democratic Credibility

    Open Access•Alexander B Downes, Todd S Sechser•International Organization•2012

  • The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution

    Open Access•David H Clark, William Reed et al.•American Journal of Political…•2005

  • Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War

    Open Access•Matthew Adam Kocher, Thomas B Pepinsky et al.•American Journal of Political…•2011

  • The limits of precision‐guided air power

    Robert A Pape•Security Studies•1997

  • Ignoring reality

    Barry D Watts•Security Studies•1997

  • Strategies of coercion

    Karl Mueller•Security Studies•1998

  • Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations

    Michael Tomz•International Organization•2007

  • The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

    Open Access•Robert Powell•Political Science Quarterly•1985

  • The Cost of Empty Threats

    Open Access•Jack Snyder, Erica D Borghard•American Political Science Review•2011

  • Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918-94

    Open Access•Christopher Gelpi, Christopher F Gelpi et al.•American Political Science Review•2001

  • Military Coercion in Interstate Crises

    Open Access•Branislav L Slantchev•American Political Science Review•2005

  • The True Worth of Air Power

    Robert A Pape•Foreign Affairs•2004

  • Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes

    Open Access•James D Fearon•American Political Science Review•1994

Unique citing works15
Citations per year2,5
Citation span2020 - 2026 (7)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 15

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae