Audience Costs, Information, and Credible Commitment Problems
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6286095 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Chungshik Moon (0000-0002-2753-4569, Australian National University), Mark Souva (0000-0002-0573-2839, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 434-458 |
| Publication date | 2016-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002714545222 |
| OpenAlex | W1985532136 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 46 |
Leaders who can accumulate audience costs can send costly signals that may help alleviate information problems associated with crisis escalation. We argue that research examining the effect of audience costs fails to appreciate the theoretical context in which audience costs matter. Audience costs may help alleviate information problems associated with international conflict. However, credible commitment problems are more central than information problems for some international conflicts. Theory does not expect audience costs to matter in this context; as a result, extant tests, and many criticisms, of the effect of audience costs on crisis escalation are flawed. We offer a more appropriate test of the effect of audience costs on crisis escalation. Consistent with extant theoretical arguments, we find that audience costs only reduce the likelihood of conflict when credible commitment problems are not the dominant concern motivating a dispute or crisis
Audience analysis · Business · Context (archaeology · Economics · Extant taxon · Political science · Public relations · Target audience · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Marketing · Political Conflict and Governance
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| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,9 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |