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The True Worth of Air Power

Bibliographic Data

ID3263758
AuthorsRobert A Pape (0000-0001-6622-1103, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume83
Issue2
Pages116
Publication date2004-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueForeign Affairs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0015-7120 • E-ISSN: 2327-7793
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/20033906
OpenAlexW2799765795
LanguageEN
Citations received11

FOR MORE THAN A DECADE, advocates of precision air weapons have argued that wars can be won by selectively taking out an enemy's leaders, its communication systems, and the economic infrastructure of its major cities. Before the Persian GulfWar, Air Force Chiefof Staff General Michael Dugan promised to end the war in days by targeting Saddam Hussein directly. Later, in Kosovo, General Michael Short, commander of allied air forces in Europe, ordered air power to go for the head of the snake. And last year, in the Iraq war, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sponsored a shock and awe air campaign against the Iraqi leadership. Whether it helps kill enemy leaders, isolate them from their troops, or make them vulnerable to overthrow by local groups, precision air power is advertised as a force that can win wars on its own. Decapitating the enemy has a seductive logic. It exploits the United States' advantage in precision air power; it promises to win wars in just days, with few casualties among friendly forces and enemy civilians; and it delays committing large numbers of ground troops until they can be welcomed as liberators rather than as conquerors. But decapitation strategies have never been effective, and the advent of precision air weaponry has not made them any more so. No doubt, precision technology has increased the accuracy of bombing. Today, 70 to 8o percent of guided munitions fall within

Economics · Physics · Political science · Power (physics) · Thermodynamics · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · Military and Defense Studies · Military History and Strategy

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Unique citing works11
Citations per year0,52
Citation span2005 - 2019 (15)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 11

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