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Barbara Styczynska

Biographic Data

ID4382305
NAMEBarbara Styczynska
GIVEN NAMESBarbara
FAMILY NAMEStyczynska
SIGNATURESTYCZYNSKA B
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Fribourg
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS3
AUTHOR COUNT1
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2006
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2006
H-INDEX1
  • The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model

    Open Access•Ansgar Belke, Barbara Styczynska•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•2006•Cited by: 3•References: 18

    This study analyses the allocation of power in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. For this purpose, two classical power indices that have their origin in solutions to co‐operative games are applied. First, an assessment is made of the effects of enlargement on the voting power of different subgroups of the Governing Council that arise in the wake o…

  • The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model

    Open Access•Ansgar Belke, Barbara Styczynska•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•2006•Cited by: 3•References: 18

    This study analyses the allocation of power in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. For this purpose, two classical power indices that have their origin in solutions to co‐operative games are applied. First, an assessment is made of the effects of enlargement on the voting power of different subgroups of the Governing Council that arise in the wake o…

  • The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model

    Open Access•Ansgar Belke, Barbara Styczynska•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•2006•Cited by: 3•References: 18

    This study analyses the allocation of power in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. For this purpose, two classical power indices that have their origin in solutions to co‐operative games are applied. First, an assessment is made of the effects of enlargement on the voting power of different subgroups of the Governing Council that arise in the wake o…

Accession (1 works) · Counterfactual thinking (1 works) · Economic and monetary union (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies (1 works) · European union (1 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (1 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (1 works) · International economics (1 works) · Law (1 works)

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