The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council
An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6282502 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ansgar Belke (0000-0002-9743-4758, University of Hohenheim), Barbara Styczynska (University of Fribourg) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 865-897 |
| Publication date | 2006-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00666.x |
| OpenAlex | W2146157449 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 19 |
This study analyses the allocation of power in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. For this purpose, two classical power indices that have their origin in solutions to co‐operative games are applied. First, an assessment is made of the effects of enlargement on the voting power of different subgroups of the Governing Council that arise in the wake of the continuous accession process. Second, a systematic comparison is carried out to the status quo rule (‘one member, one vote’) with respect to the voting power of the ECB Executive Board and to the representativeness of European monetary policy, along with the potential for its renationalization
Accession · Counterfactual thinking · Economic and monetary union · Economics · European union · International economics · Member states · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Representativeness heuristic · Resizing · Statistics · Status quo · Status quo bias · Voting · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,18 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2017 (9) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |