Ulrike Leopold‐wildburger
Biographic Data
| ID | 4382392 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ulrike Leopold‐wildburger |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ulrike |
| FAMILY NAME | Leopold‐wildburger |
| SIGNATURE | WILDBURGER U L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Graz |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3246-2109 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Voting in EMU — An Experimental Study of Institutional Innovation and the Role of Communication in the Stability and Growth Pact
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the EU's economic and monetary union (EMU) aims to assure sound public finances in the EMU Member States by providing for sanctions against countries with excessive deficits. We experimentally examine the voting procedure of the SGP and find that the institutional rules are not at all satisfactory. As an institutional innovation, we test a procedure where fiscal sinners are excluded from voting, as suggested…
Towards Bounded Rationality within Rational Expectations — Some Comments from an Economic Point of View
Voting in EMU — An Experimental Study of Institutional Innovation and the Role of Communication in the Stability and Growth Pact
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the EU's economic and monetary union (EMU) aims to assure sound public finances in the EMU Member States by providing for sanctions against countries with excessive deficits. We experimentally examine the voting procedure of the SGP and find that the institutional rules are not at all satisfactory. As an institutional innovation, we test a procedure where fiscal sinners are excluded from voting, as suggested…
Towards Bounded Rationality within Rational Expectations — Some Comments from an Economic Point of View
Voting in EMU — An Experimental Study of Institutional Innovation and the Role of Communication in the Stability and Growth Pact
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the EU's economic and monetary union (EMU) aims to assure sound public finances in the EMU Member States by providing for sanctions against countries with excessive deficits. We experimentally examine the voting procedure of the SGP and find that the institutional rules are not at all satisfactory. As an institutional innovation, we test a procedure where fiscal sinners are excluded from voting, as suggested…
Economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Bounded rationality (1 works) · Business (1 works) · Context (archaeology) (1 works) · Ecological rationality (1 works) · Economic and monetary union (1 works) · Economic Policies and Impacts (1 works) · Economic theories and models (1 works)