Voting in EMU — An Experimental Study of Institutional Innovation and the Role of Communication in the Stability and Growth Pact

Bibliographic Data

ID6282873
AuthorsBernd Irlenbusch (0000-0002-3433-2826, IZA - Institute of Labor Economics), Ulrike Leopold‐wildburger (0000-0002-3246-2109, University of Graz), Jörg Schütze (University of Graz), Matthias Sutter (0000-0002-6143-8706, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics)
Year2003
Volume41
Issue4
Pages645-664
Publication date2003-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1468-5965.00439
OpenAlexW2006427971
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited8

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the EU's economic and monetary union (EMU) aims to assure sound public finances in the EMU Member States by providing for sanctions against countries with excessive deficits. We experimentally examine the voting procedure of the SGP and find that the institutional rules are not at all satisfactory. As an institutional innovation, we test a procedure where fiscal sinners are excluded from voting, as suggested by Otmar Issing. It turns out that this modification is surprisingly successful. In addition, our study shows that the opportunity to communicate has a significant impact and tends to mitigate the Pact's shortcomings

Business · Economic and monetary union · Economics · European union · International economics · International trade · Law and economics · Member states · Monetary economics · Pact · Political science · Public economics · Sanctions · Stability (learning theory · Stability and Growth Pact · Test (biology · Voting · Economic Policies and Impacts · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law

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