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Thomas J Kasen

Biographic Data

ID4382596
NAMEThomas J Kasen
GIVEN NAMESThomas J
FAMILY NAMEKasen
SIGNATUREKASEN T J
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Wisconsin
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS3
AUTHOR COUNT1
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1979
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1979
H-INDEX1
  • A Competitive Test of the M1(i) and M1(im) Bargaining Sets

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, Melvin M Sakurai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1979•Cited by: 3•References: 12

    Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1(i) bargaining set and the M1(im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1(im) is significantly and consistently superior to M1(i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences bet…

  • A Competitive Test of the M1(i) and M1(im) Bargaining Sets

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, Melvin M Sakurai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1979•Cited by: 3•References: 12

    Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1(i) bargaining set and the M1(im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1(im) is significantly and consistently superior to M1(i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences bet…

  • A Competitive Test of the M1(i) and M1(im) Bargaining Sets

    Open Access•H Andrew Michener, Melvin M Sakurai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1979•Cited by: 3•References: 12

    Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1(i) bargaining set and the M1(im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1(im) is significantly and consistently superior to M1(i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p <.01). Results are discussed in terms of the formal differences bet…

Bargaining problem (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Distribution (mathematics (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (1 works) · Finance (1 works) · Finance (1 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (1 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (1 works) · Mathematical analysis (1 works)

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