J Atsu Amegashie
Biographic Data
| ID | 4382632 |
|---|---|
| NAME | J Atsu Amegashie |
| GIVEN NAMES | J Atsu |
| FAMILY NAME | Amegashie |
| SIGNATURE | AMEGASHIE J A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Simon Fraser University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 31 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts
The authors consider a two-period game of conflict between two factions, which have a desire for revenge. It is shown that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by two effects: a value of revenge effect (i.e., the benefit of exacting revenge) and a self-deterrence effect (i.e., the fear of an opponent’s desire to exact revenge). The…
A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter
The All-Pay Auction When a Committee Awards the Prize
Committees and Rent-Seeking Effort under Probabilistic Voting
How Unpleasant a Result? A Reply to Derek J. Clark
Some Results on Rent-Seeking Contests with Shortlisting
The design of rent-seeking competitions
The number of rent-seekers and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures
The design of rent-seeking competitions
Some Results on Rent-Seeking Contests with Shortlisting
A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter
The number of rent-seekers and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures
The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts
The authors consider a two-period game of conflict between two factions, which have a desire for revenge. It is shown that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by two effects: a value of revenge effect (i.e., the benefit of exacting revenge) and a self-deterrence effect (i.e., the fear of an opponent’s desire to exact revenge). The…
The All-Pay Auction When a Committee Awards the Prize
Committees and Rent-Seeking Effort under Probabilistic Voting
The design of rent-seeking competitions
The number of rent-seekers and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures
How Unpleasant a Result? A Reply to Derek J. Clark
Some Results on Rent-Seeking Contests with Shortlisting
Committees and Rent-Seeking Effort under Probabilistic Voting
The All-Pay Auction When a Committee Awards the Prize
A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter
The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts
The authors consider a two-period game of conflict between two factions, which have a desire for revenge. It is shown that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by two effects: a value of revenge effect (i.e., the benefit of exacting revenge) and a self-deterrence effect (i.e., the fear of an opponent’s desire to exact revenge). The…
Economics (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Public finance (7 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (5 works) · Macroeconomics (5 works) · CONTEST (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Politics (4 works)