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Michael Orkin

Biographic Data

ID4382654
NAMEMichael Orkin
GIVEN NAMESMichael
FAMILY NAMEOrkin
SIGNATUREORKIN M
AFFILIATIONSCalifornia State University System
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS1
WORKS AS AUTHOR1
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1987
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1987
H-INDEX1
  • Balanced Strategies for Prisoner's Dilemma

    Open Access•Michael Orkin•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1987•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    When is a strategy cooperative, yet safe from invasion? A mathematical characterization of such strategies is given, which I call “balanced.” I show that tit-for-tat is balanced, and, in general, a strategy is balanced if and only if its probability of defection on a particular move is sufficiently large relative to the opponent's cumulative score and sufficiently low relative to its own cumulative score

  • Balanced Strategies for Prisoner's Dilemma

    Open Access•Michael Orkin•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1987•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    When is a strategy cooperative, yet safe from invasion? A mathematical characterization of such strategies is given, which I call “balanced.” I show that tit-for-tat is balanced, and, in general, a strategy is balanced if and only if its probability of defection on a particular move is sufficiently large relative to the opponent's cumulative score and sufficiently low relative to its own cumulative score

  • Balanced Strategies for Prisoner's Dilemma

    Open Access•Michael Orkin•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1987•Cited by: 1•References: 4

    When is a strategy cooperative, yet safe from invasion? A mathematical characterization of such strategies is given, which I call “balanced.” I show that tit-for-tat is balanced, and, in general, a strategy is balanced if and only if its probability of defection on a particular move is sufficiently large relative to the opponent's cumulative score and sufficiently low relative to its own cumulative score

Adversary (1 work) · Dilemma (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (1 work) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (1 work) · Game theory (1 work) · Game Theory and Applications (1 work) · Mathematical economics (1 work) · Mathematics (1 work) · Microeconomics (1 work)

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