Balanced Strategies for Prisoner's Dilemma
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283766 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Orkin (California State University System, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 186-191 |
| Publication date | 1987-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002787031001010 |
| OpenAlex | W2162263067 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
When is a strategy cooperative, yet safe from invasion? A mathematical characterization of such strategies is given, which I call “balanced.” I show that tit-for-tat is balanced, and, in general, a strategy is balanced if and only if its probability of defection on a particular move is sufficiently large relative to the opponent's cumulative score and sufficiently low relative to its own cumulative score
Adversary · Dilemma · Economics · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Prisoner's dilemma · Statistics · Superrationality · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics
| Citations per year | 0.03 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1995 - 1995 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |