T Edward Westen
Biographic Data
| ID | 4382907 |
|---|---|
| NAME | T Edward Westen |
| GIVEN NAMES | T Edward |
| FAMILY NAME | Westen |
| SIGNATURE | WESTEN T E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Department of Government and International Studies University of South Carolina |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1974 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1976 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Bargaining Set Theory and Majority Rule
The kernel and the bargaining set are employed as predictors of experimental trials for four and five person simple majority rule games. Both concepts are found to be good predictors of game outcomes. A comparison is made between the bargaining set concepts and the von Neumann and Morgenstern solution sets which demonstrates that bargaining theory is the better predictor. The authors statistically manipulated experimental control variables to mak…
Toward an Explanation of Experimentally Obtained Outcomes to a Simple, Majority Rule Game
The problem of so embarrassingly many solutions to n-person games is examined through the vehicle of a four-person simple, majority rule game. Ninety-seven experimental trials are employed to demonstrate that three different solutions (symmetric, inflated, and partitioned solutions) can be differentially predicted as one varies the structural characteristics of otherwise strictly identical games in character istic function form. The authors inter…
Toward an Explanation of Experimentally Obtained Outcomes to a Simple, Majority Rule Game
The problem of so embarrassingly many solutions to n-person games is examined through the vehicle of a four-person simple, majority rule game. Ninety-seven experimental trials are employed to demonstrate that three different solutions (symmetric, inflated, and partitioned solutions) can be differentially predicted as one varies the structural characteristics of otherwise strictly identical games in character istic function form. The authors inter…
Bargaining Set Theory and Majority Rule
The kernel and the bargaining set are employed as predictors of experimental trials for four and five person simple majority rule games. Both concepts are found to be good predictors of game outcomes. A comparison is made between the bargaining set concepts and the von Neumann and Morgenstern solution sets which demonstrates that bargaining theory is the better predictor. The authors statistically manipulated experimental control variables to mak…
Toward an Explanation of Experimentally Obtained Outcomes to a Simple, Majority Rule Game
The problem of so embarrassingly many solutions to n-person games is examined through the vehicle of a four-person simple, majority rule game. Ninety-seven experimental trials are employed to demonstrate that three different solutions (symmetric, inflated, and partitioned solutions) can be differentially predicted as one varies the structural characteristics of otherwise strictly identical games in character istic function form. The authors inter…
Bargaining Set Theory and Majority Rule
The kernel and the bargaining set are employed as predictors of experimental trials for four and five person simple majority rule games. Both concepts are found to be good predictors of game outcomes. A comparison is made between the bargaining set concepts and the von Neumann and Morgenstern solution sets which demonstrates that bargaining theory is the better predictor. The authors statistically manipulated experimental control variables to mak…
Epistemology (2 works) · Game theory (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Simple (philosophy (2 works) · Character (mathematics (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Econometrics (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (1 works)