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Toward an Explanation of Experimentally Obtained Outcomes to a Simple, Majority Rule Game

Bibliographic Data

ID6284752
AuthorsT Edward Westen (Department of Government and International Studies University of South Carolina), James J Buckley (0000-0003-2264-4096, Department of Mathematics and Computer Science University of South Carolina)
Year1974
Volume18
Issue2
Pages198-236
Publication date1974-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/002200277401800202
OpenAlexW1993823698
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited13

The problem of so embarrassingly many solutions to n-person games is examined through the vehicle of a four-person simple, majority rule game. Ninety-seven experimental trials are employed to demonstrate that three different solutions (symmetric, inflated, and partitioned solutions) can be differentially predicted as one varies the structural characteristics of otherwise strictly identical games in character istic function form. The authors interpret their findings as an indication that systematic theory construction about the structure of conflict is a fruitful area for inquiry

Character (mathematics · Epistemology · Function (biology · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Simple (philosophy · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Psychology · Sports Analytics and Performance

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Unique citing works5
Citations per year0,1
Citation span1976 - 1981 (6)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 4

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