Richard J Morrison
Biographic Data
| ID | 4382925 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Richard J Morrison |
| GIVEN NAMES | Richard J |
| FAMILY NAME | Morrison |
| SIGNATURE | MORRISON R J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Carnegie Mellon University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1972 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Computational methods for income transfer analysis
The analysis of transfer systems that include both social benefit and taxation programs is complicated by the fact that the component programs comprising those systems interact. This paper develops a mathematical framework for the analysis of such systems at the micro‐level, i.e., using an individual or family as the unit of analysis. The first section describes the importance of income transfer issues and identifies criteria for evaluating propo…
Contending “signals” in coalition choice
During negotiations for coalitions, each actor presumably searches his decision environment for organizing principles—signals—which, if present, would turn the negotiations in his favor. With only one prominent signal, we expect it to determine the nature of agreements, but things may be different with multiple signals. Data from four studies of a weighted‐majority game, two using only relative status of winnings in the game as the incentive (i.e…
Bargaining Processes and Coalition Outcomes: An Integration
This paper discusses a theory of bargaining processes in three-person coalition games and investigates the relation between these processes and the outcome of bargaining. The bargaining theory uses an information-processing approach to model each of the three player's cognitive processes and interrelates three such models to predict who says what to whom next in the bargaining for coalition partners and payoff allocations. The theory succeeds in …
Caplow's model: A reformulation
This paper examines Caplow's model of coalitions in the triad and identifies several shortcomings. Retaining the basic structure of Caplow's arguments, it recasts the problem as one of interdependent rational decision making. The reformulation allows increased generality in several directions, including a more general notion of strength, relaxation of the additivity assumption about strength, and the adoption of probabilistic choice to allow pred…
Coalitions and payoffs in three‐person sequential games: Initial tests of two formal models
In this paper we develop two formal models predicting coalitions and payoffs among rank striving players in a sequential three‐person game. We test the models’ predictions with data from a laboratory study of eleven male triads. Each triad plays a sequence of games; in each game a two‐person coalition forms and divides the coalition's point value between the two coalition partners. Participants know that the sequence of games will end without war…
A statistical model for legislative roll call analysis
This paper addresses the problem of using roll call voting data to ascertain the ideal points of legislators in a multi‐dimensional space. After identifying difficulties inherent in factor analytic studies of roll call data, I present a simple formal model of legislative voting that resolves these difficulties. Finally, I derive some implications of the model and use them to outline a technique for estimating legislators' ideal points
Bargaining Processes and Coalition Outcomes: An Integration
This paper discusses a theory of bargaining processes in three-person coalition games and investigates the relation between these processes and the outcome of bargaining. The bargaining theory uses an information-processing approach to model each of the three player's cognitive processes and interrelates three such models to predict who says what to whom next in the bargaining for coalition partners and payoff allocations. The theory succeeds in …
Coalitions and payoffs in three‐person sequential games: Initial tests of two formal models
In this paper we develop two formal models predicting coalitions and payoffs among rank striving players in a sequential three‐person game. We test the models’ predictions with data from a laboratory study of eleven male triads. Each triad plays a sequence of games; in each game a two‐person coalition forms and divides the coalition's point value between the two coalition partners. Participants know that the sequence of games will end without war…
A statistical model for legislative roll call analysis
This paper addresses the problem of using roll call voting data to ascertain the ideal points of legislators in a multi‐dimensional space. After identifying difficulties inherent in factor analytic studies of roll call data, I present a simple formal model of legislative voting that resolves these difficulties. Finally, I derive some implications of the model and use them to outline a technique for estimating legislators' ideal points
Contending “signals” in coalition choice
During negotiations for coalitions, each actor presumably searches his decision environment for organizing principles—signals—which, if present, would turn the negotiations in his favor. With only one prominent signal, we expect it to determine the nature of agreements, but things may be different with multiple signals. Data from four studies of a weighted‐majority game, two using only relative status of winnings in the game as the incentive (i.e…
A statistical model for legislative roll call analysis
This paper addresses the problem of using roll call voting data to ascertain the ideal points of legislators in a multi‐dimensional space. After identifying difficulties inherent in factor analytic studies of roll call data, I present a simple formal model of legislative voting that resolves these difficulties. Finally, I derive some implications of the model and use them to outline a technique for estimating legislators' ideal points
Coalitions and payoffs in three‐person sequential games: Initial tests of two formal models
In this paper we develop two formal models predicting coalitions and payoffs among rank striving players in a sequential three‐person game. We test the models’ predictions with data from a laboratory study of eleven male triads. Each triad plays a sequence of games; in each game a two‐person coalition forms and divides the coalition's point value between the two coalition partners. Participants know that the sequence of games will end without war…
Caplow's model: A reformulation
This paper examines Caplow's model of coalitions in the triad and identifies several shortcomings. Retaining the basic structure of Caplow's arguments, it recasts the problem as one of interdependent rational decision making. The reformulation allows increased generality in several directions, including a more general notion of strength, relaxation of the additivity assumption about strength, and the adoption of probabilistic choice to allow pred…
Bargaining Processes and Coalition Outcomes: An Integration
This paper discusses a theory of bargaining processes in three-person coalition games and investigates the relation between these processes and the outcome of bargaining. The bargaining theory uses an information-processing approach to model each of the three player's cognitive processes and interrelates three such models to predict who says what to whom next in the bargaining for coalition partners and payoff allocations. The theory succeeds in …
Contending “signals” in coalition choice
During negotiations for coalitions, each actor presumably searches his decision environment for organizing principles—signals—which, if present, would turn the negotiations in his favor. With only one prominent signal, we expect it to determine the nature of agreements, but things may be different with multiple signals. Data from four studies of a weighted‐majority game, two using only relative status of winnings in the game as the incentive (i.e…
Computational methods for income transfer analysis
The analysis of transfer systems that include both social benefit and taxation programs is complicated by the fact that the component programs comprising those systems interact. This paper develops a mathematical framework for the analysis of such systems at the micro‐level, i.e., using an individual or family as the unit of analysis. The first section describes the importance of income transfer issues and identifies criteria for evaluating propo…
Computer Science (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Game theory (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Rank (graph theory (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works)