Jinhee Jo
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4383094 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jinhee Jo |
| NOMBRES | Jinhee |
| APELLIDO | Jo |
| FIRMA | JO J |
| AFILIACIONES | Kyung Hee University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5685-3449 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 34 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2011 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2022 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Partisan Polarization in Korea
While many people think that ideological conflict is one of the most serious problems in Korean society, previous studies find no strong evidence of ideological polarization. Have partisan voters been more ideologically divided over time in Korea? If not, is it just their perception on major political parties? Or, do partisans dislike each other more than before, so they look ideologically more polarized? Using the election survey data from the 1…
Policy dynamics and electoral uncertainty in the appointments process
By incorporating electoral uncertainty and policy dynamics into three two-period models of the appointments process, we show that gridlock may not always occur under divided government, contrary to the findings of static one-shot appointments models. In these cases, contrary to the ally principle familiar to students of bureaucratic politics, the president or the confirmer is willing to move the court away from his or her ideal point as a way to …
Now or later? A dynamic analysis of judicial appointments
Observing substantial variations in Senate confirmation durations, existing studies have tried to explain when the Senate takes more or less time to confirm presidential nominees. However, they have largely ignored the president’s incentives to nominate someone who he expects will be delayed and do not specify conditions under which delay occurs. To improve on existing literature, I develop a dynamic model of presidential appointments in which th…
Anchors Away
Existing methods for estimating ideal points of legislators that are comparable across time and chambers make restrictive assumptions regarding how legislators' ideal points can move over time, either by fixing some legislators' ideal points or by constraining their movement over time. These assumptions are clearly contradictory to some theories of congressional responsiveness to election dynamics and changes in constituency. Instead of using leg…
Information and International Institutions Revisited
In a recent article in this journal, Chapman presents a formal model of the informational role played by international institutions. Unfortunately, the equilibria given in the article are incorrect. In this article, we identify the errors in the analysis of Chapman and solve for correct equilibria to the model. Our results show little support for the empirical implications derived in the original article. Contrary to these original findings, we f…
Rational incompetence
When something goes awry in a governmental agency, a frequent claim is that appointed political heads are incompetent. If true, what explains this in a separation of powers system where the executive nominates and the legislature approves? Our analysis provides a rationale and conditions for rational incompetence. Specifically, we present a model in which a President nominates and the Senate confirms or rejects an appointee. Besides choosing a no…
Nonuniqueness of the Equilibrium in Lewis and Schultz's Model
Lewis and Schultz (2003) develop a statistical signaling model to deal with international conflicts or bargaining situations in which states have private information about their payoffs. They claim that they can confirm that there always exists a unique equilibrium in their model. In this paper, I show that Lewis and Schultz's claim is not true and their model admits multiple equilibria under some parameter settings. Monte Carlo analysis shows th…
Anchors Away
Existing methods for estimating ideal points of legislators that are comparable across time and chambers make restrictive assumptions regarding how legislators' ideal points can move over time, either by fixing some legislators' ideal points or by constraining their movement over time. These assumptions are clearly contradictory to some theories of congressional responsiveness to election dynamics and changes in constituency. Instead of using leg…
Policy dynamics and electoral uncertainty in the appointments process
By incorporating electoral uncertainty and policy dynamics into three two-period models of the appointments process, we show that gridlock may not always occur under divided government, contrary to the findings of static one-shot appointments models. In these cases, contrary to the ally principle familiar to students of bureaucratic politics, the president or the confirmer is willing to move the court away from his or her ideal point as a way to …
Now or later? A dynamic analysis of judicial appointments
Observing substantial variations in Senate confirmation durations, existing studies have tried to explain when the Senate takes more or less time to confirm presidential nominees. However, they have largely ignored the president’s incentives to nominate someone who he expects will be delayed and do not specify conditions under which delay occurs. To improve on existing literature, I develop a dynamic model of presidential appointments in which th…
Rational incompetence
When something goes awry in a governmental agency, a frequent claim is that appointed political heads are incompetent. If true, what explains this in a separation of powers system where the executive nominates and the legislature approves? Our analysis provides a rationale and conditions for rational incompetence. Specifically, we present a model in which a President nominates and the Senate confirms or rejects an appointee. Besides choosing a no…
Nonuniqueness of the Equilibrium in Lewis and Schultz's Model
Lewis and Schultz (2003) develop a statistical signaling model to deal with international conflicts or bargaining situations in which states have private information about their payoffs. They claim that they can confirm that there always exists a unique equilibrium in their model. In this paper, I show that Lewis and Schultz's claim is not true and their model admits multiple equilibria under some parameter settings. Monte Carlo analysis shows th…
Nonuniqueness of the Equilibrium in Lewis and Schultz's Model
Lewis and Schultz (2003) develop a statistical signaling model to deal with international conflicts or bargaining situations in which states have private information about their payoffs. They claim that they can confirm that there always exists a unique equilibrium in their model. In this paper, I show that Lewis and Schultz's claim is not true and their model admits multiple equilibria under some parameter settings. Monte Carlo analysis shows th…
Rational incompetence
When something goes awry in a governmental agency, a frequent claim is that appointed political heads are incompetent. If true, what explains this in a separation of powers system where the executive nominates and the legislature approves? Our analysis provides a rationale and conditions for rational incompetence. Specifically, we present a model in which a President nominates and the Senate confirms or rejects an appointee. Besides choosing a no…
Information and International Institutions Revisited
In a recent article in this journal, Chapman presents a formal model of the informational role played by international institutions. Unfortunately, the equilibria given in the article are incorrect. In this article, we identify the errors in the analysis of Chapman and solve for correct equilibria to the model. Our results show little support for the empirical implications derived in the original article. Contrary to these original findings, we f…
Anchors Away
Existing methods for estimating ideal points of legislators that are comparable across time and chambers make restrictive assumptions regarding how legislators' ideal points can move over time, either by fixing some legislators' ideal points or by constraining their movement over time. These assumptions are clearly contradictory to some theories of congressional responsiveness to election dynamics and changes in constituency. Instead of using leg…
Policy dynamics and electoral uncertainty in the appointments process
By incorporating electoral uncertainty and policy dynamics into three two-period models of the appointments process, we show that gridlock may not always occur under divided government, contrary to the findings of static one-shot appointments models. In these cases, contrary to the ally principle familiar to students of bureaucratic politics, the president or the confirmer is willing to move the court away from his or her ideal point as a way to …
Now or later? A dynamic analysis of judicial appointments
Observing substantial variations in Senate confirmation durations, existing studies have tried to explain when the Senate takes more or less time to confirm presidential nominees. However, they have largely ignored the president’s incentives to nominate someone who he expects will be delayed and do not specify conditions under which delay occurs. To improve on existing literature, I develop a dynamic model of presidential appointments in which th…
Partisan Polarization in Korea
While many people think that ideological conflict is one of the most serious problems in Korean society, previous studies find no strong evidence of ideological polarization. Have partisan voters been more ideologically divided over time in Korea? If not, is it just their perception on major political parties? Or, do partisans dislike each other more than before, so they look ideologically more polarized? Using the election survey data from the 1…
Economics (6 obras) · Political science (6 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Law and economics (5 obras) · Politics (5 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Economic Policies and Impacts (2 obras) · Ideal (ethics (2 obras)