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Robert F Henager

Biographic Data

ID4383161
NAMERobert F Henager
GIVEN NAMESRobert F
FAMILY NAMEHenager
SIGNATUREHENAGER R F
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS29
WORKS AS AUTHOR1
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1996
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1996
H-INDEX1
  • Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas

    Open Access•Craig D Parks, Robert F Henager et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1996•Cited by: 29•References: 23

    This study examined how low- and high-trust individuals react to messages of intended behavior in a social dilemma situation. Subjects played a two-person prisoner's dilemma; the opponent was a reciprocal strategy programmed by the experimenter. During the game, subjects received a message stating that the opponent planned to be cooperative or competitive for the remainder of the game. In Study 1, low trusters reacted to the competitive message b…

  • Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas

    Open Access•Craig D Parks, Robert F Henager et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1996•Cited by: 29•References: 23

    This study examined how low- and high-trust individuals react to messages of intended behavior in a social dilemma situation. Subjects played a two-person prisoner's dilemma; the opponent was a reciprocal strategy programmed by the experimenter. During the game, subjects received a message stating that the opponent planned to be cooperative or competitive for the remainder of the game. In Study 1, low trusters reacted to the competitive message b…

  • Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas

    Open Access•Craig D Parks, Robert F Henager et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1996•Cited by: 29•References: 23

    This study examined how low- and high-trust individuals react to messages of intended behavior in a social dilemma situation. Subjects played a two-person prisoner's dilemma; the opponent was a reciprocal strategy programmed by the experimenter. During the game, subjects received a message stating that the opponent planned to be cooperative or competitive for the remainder of the game. In Study 1, low trusters reacted to the competitive message b…

Adversary (1 work) · Affect (linguistics (1 work) · Communication (1 work) · Communication (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Computer security (1 work) · Cultural Differences and Values (1 work) · Dilemma (1 work) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (1 work) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (1 work)

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