Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6285789
AutoresCraig D Parks (0000-0001-5299-093X, Washington State University), Robert F Henager, Shawn D Scamahorn (Washington State University)
Año1996
Volumen40
Número1
Páginas134-151
Fecha de publicación1996-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002796040001007
OpenAlexW2006698333
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas37
Referencias citadas25

This study examined how low- and high-trust individuals react to messages of intended behavior in a social dilemma situation. Subjects played a two-person prisoner's dilemma; the opponent was a reciprocal strategy programmed by the experimenter. During the game, subjects received a message stating that the opponent planned to be cooperative or competitive for the remainder of the game. In Study 1, low trusters reacted to the competitive message by decreasing cooperation but were unaffected by the cooperative message; high trusters reacted to the cooperative message by increasing cooperation but were unaffected by the competitive message. Study 2 showed that a period of unconditional, message-consistent behavior immediately after the message can make low and high trusters responsive to cooperative and competitive messages, respectively. However, the number of unconditional responses was crucial. The study also found that stated intention and message-inconsistent behavior affect perceptions of the opponent's trustworthiness

Adversary · Affect (linguistics · Computer security · Dilemma · Perception · Prisoner's dilemma · Reciprocal · Social dilemma · Trustworthiness · Communication · Computer Science · Cultural Differences and Values · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Social Psychology