Michael Fuerstein
Biographic Data
| ID | 4384736 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Fuerstein |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Fuerstein |
| SIGNATURE | FUERSTEIN M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Saint Olaf College , Northfield , MN , USA |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Moral Progress as Liberal Hegemony
I argue that Rahel Jaeggi’s processual account of progress cannot support substantive judgments of progress without privileging liberal values and outcomes over their alternatives. To privilege those values is perhaps not to become a hegemon in the strongest sense, but it does nudge us uncomfortably in that direction. In this respect, I suggest, a comparison with a near cousin of Jaeggi’s approach – that of John Dewey – is informative. Dewey’s vi…
Epistemic democracy without truth
Epistemic Democracy Without Truth
Dans cet article, je mets l’approche pragmatiste deweyenne de l’épistémologie démocratique en relation avec l’approche contemporaine de la « démocratie épistémique ». De manière similaire aux démocrates épistémiques, John Dewey caractérise la démocratie comme une forme d’enquête sociale. Or, alors que les démocrates épistémiques suggèrent que la démocratie vise à « poursuivre la vérité », Dewey rejette la notion de « correspondance » à la vérité …
Democratic Representatives as Epistemic Intermediaries
This chapter develops a model of democratic representation from the standpoint of epistemic theories of democracy. Such theories justify democracy in terms of its tendency to yield decisions that “track the truth” by integrating asymmetrically dispersed knowledge. From an epistemic point of view, I suggest, democratic representatives are best modeled as epistemic intermediaries who facilitate the vertical integration of knowledge between policy e…
Democratic Experiments
Contesting the market
The chapter argues that capitalism presents a threat to “democratic contestation”: the egalitarian, socially distributed capacity to affect how, why, and whether power is used. Markets are not susceptible to mechanisms of accountability, nor are they bearers of intentions in the way that political power-holders are. This makes them resistant to the kind of rational, intentional oversight that constitutes one of democracy’s social virtues. Four so…
Democratic Consensus as an Essential Byproduct
but, in my usage, a political issue is epistemic when there is some right (or at least best) answer concerning how it ought to be resolved that is independent of people's beliefs or desires about how it ought to be resolved.An important secondary claim, then, is that it is difficult to explain the presumptive value of political deliberation unless we understand a very large share of political issues as epistemic in nature.The significance of cons…
Epistemic Trust and Liberal Justification
Democratic Consensus as an Essential Byproduct
but, in my usage, a political issue is epistemic when there is some right (or at least best) answer concerning how it ought to be resolved that is independent of people's beliefs or desires about how it ought to be resolved.An important secondary claim, then, is that it is difficult to explain the presumptive value of political deliberation unless we understand a very large share of political issues as epistemic in nature.The significance of cons…
Epistemic Democracy Without Truth
Dans cet article, je mets l’approche pragmatiste deweyenne de l’épistémologie démocratique en relation avec l’approche contemporaine de la « démocratie épistémique ». De manière similaire aux démocrates épistémiques, John Dewey caractérise la démocratie comme une forme d’enquête sociale. Or, alors que les démocrates épistémiques suggèrent que la démocratie vise à « poursuivre la vérité », Dewey rejette la notion de « correspondance » à la vérité …
Epistemic Trust and Liberal Justification
Democratic Consensus as an Essential Byproduct
but, in my usage, a political issue is epistemic when there is some right (or at least best) answer concerning how it ought to be resolved that is independent of people's beliefs or desires about how it ought to be resolved.An important secondary claim, then, is that it is difficult to explain the presumptive value of political deliberation unless we understand a very large share of political issues as epistemic in nature.The significance of cons…
Contesting the market
The chapter argues that capitalism presents a threat to “democratic contestation”: the egalitarian, socially distributed capacity to affect how, why, and whether power is used. Markets are not susceptible to mechanisms of accountability, nor are they bearers of intentions in the way that political power-holders are. This makes them resistant to the kind of rational, intentional oversight that constitutes one of democracy’s social virtues. Four so…
Democratic Experiments
Democratic Representatives as Epistemic Intermediaries
This chapter develops a model of democratic representation from the standpoint of epistemic theories of democracy. Such theories justify democracy in terms of its tendency to yield decisions that “track the truth” by integrating asymmetrically dispersed knowledge. From an epistemic point of view, I suggest, democratic representatives are best modeled as epistemic intermediaries who facilitate the vertical integration of knowledge between policy e…
Epistemic democracy without truth
Epistemic Democracy Without Truth
Dans cet article, je mets l’approche pragmatiste deweyenne de l’épistémologie démocratique en relation avec l’approche contemporaine de la « démocratie épistémique ». De manière similaire aux démocrates épistémiques, John Dewey caractérise la démocratie comme une forme d’enquête sociale. Or, alors que les démocrates épistémiques suggèrent que la démocratie vise à « poursuivre la vérité », Dewey rejette la notion de « correspondance » à la vérité …
Moral Progress as Liberal Hegemony
I argue that Rahel Jaeggi’s processual account of progress cannot support substantive judgments of progress without privileging liberal values and outcomes over their alternatives. To privilege those values is perhaps not to become a hegemon in the strongest sense, but it does nudge us uncomfortably in that direction. In this respect, I suggest, a comparison with a near cousin of Jaeggi’s approach – that of John Dewey – is informative. Dewey’s vi…
Democracy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works)