Moral Progress as Liberal Hegemony
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6415014 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Fuerstein (Saint Olaf College , Northfield , MN , USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 271-288 |
| Publication date | 2025-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Analyse & Kritik (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0171-5860 • E-ISSN: 2365-9858 |
| Publisher | De Gruyter (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/auk-2025-2013 |
| OpenAlex | W7106700401 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 7 |
I argue that Rahel Jaeggi’s processual account of progress cannot support substantive judgments of progress without privileging liberal values and outcomes over their alternatives. To privilege those values is perhaps not to become a hegemon in the strongest sense, but it does nudge us uncomfortably in that direction. In this respect, I suggest, a comparison with a near cousin of Jaeggi’s approach – that of John Dewey – is informative. Dewey’s view also centers on a pluralistic model of ‘problems’ that yield diverse, context-sensitive improvements, and Jaeggi herself openly aligns herself with Dewey. But Dewey’s view depends on an open embrace of core liberal principles that seem to entail invidious cross-cultural judgments. Jaeggi thinks that she can avoid this prospect, but the comparison with Dewey presents a number of reasons to doubt this. On a speculative note, I conclude that the notion of progress itself, as a normative ideal, may be inextricably linked to certain core liberal commitments. In that respect the idea of progress may involve liberal hegemony by nature, in at least a weak sense of the idea
Core (optical fiber · Cousin · Hegemony · Liberalism · Normative · Privilege (computing
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |