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Arnaud Dellis

Biographic Data

ID4386192
NAMEArnaud Dellis
GIVEN NAMESArnaud
FAMILY NAMEDellis
SIGNATUREDELLIS A
AFFILIATIONSUniversité du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
ORCID0000-0002-3269-0478
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS9
WORKS AS AUTHOR4
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2003
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2020
H-INDEX2
  • Subpoena power and informational lobbying

    Open Access•Arnaud Dellis, Mandar Oak•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 43

    This article studies the role of subpoena power in enabling policymakers to make better-informed decisions. In particular, we take into account the effect of subpoena power on the information voluntarily supplied by interest groups as well as the information obtained by the policymaker via the subpoena process. To this end, we develop a model of informational lobbying in which interest groups seek access to the policymaker in order to provide him…

  • Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule

    Arnaud Dellis, Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2017

    We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the alternative-vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent plurality rule. We show that, like the plurality rule, the alternative-vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of candidates at more than two positions. Moreover, the alternative-vote rule tends to support less policy polarization than the plurality rule. These resul…

  • Weak undominance in scoring rule elections

    Open Access•Arnaud Dellis•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2010•Cited by: 1•References: 15

  • Family size and optimal income taxation

    Open Access•Helmuth Cremer, Arnaud Dellis et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2003•Cited by: 6•References: 2

  • Family size and optimal income taxation

    Open Access•Helmuth Cremer, Arnaud Dellis et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2003•Cited by: 6•References: 2

  • Subpoena power and informational lobbying

    Open Access•Arnaud Dellis, Mandar Oak•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 43

    This article studies the role of subpoena power in enabling policymakers to make better-informed decisions. In particular, we take into account the effect of subpoena power on the information voluntarily supplied by interest groups as well as the information obtained by the policymaker via the subpoena process. To this end, we develop a model of informational lobbying in which interest groups seek access to the policymaker in order to provide him…

  • Weak undominance in scoring rule elections

    Open Access•Arnaud Dellis•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2010•Cited by: 1•References: 15

  • Family size and optimal income taxation

    Open Access•Helmuth Cremer, Arnaud Dellis et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2003•Cited by: 6•References: 2

  • Weak undominance in scoring rule elections

    Open Access•Arnaud Dellis•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2010•Cited by: 1•References: 15

  • Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule

    Arnaud Dellis, Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2017

    We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the alternative-vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent plurality rule. We show that, like the plurality rule, the alternative-vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of candidates at more than two positions. Moreover, the alternative-vote rule tends to support less policy polarization than the plurality rule. These resul…

  • Subpoena power and informational lobbying

    Open Access•Arnaud Dellis, Mandar Oak•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 43

    This article studies the role of subpoena power in enabling policymakers to make better-informed decisions. In particular, we take into account the effect of subpoena power on the information voluntarily supplied by interest groups as well as the information obtained by the policymaker via the subpoena process. To this end, we develop a model of informational lobbying in which interest groups seek access to the policymaker in order to provide him…

Economics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work)

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