Subpoena power and informational lobbying
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6298487 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Arnaud Dellis (0000-0002-3269-0478, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada, corresponding author), Mandar Oak (0000-0002-7018-8737, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 188-234 |
| Publication date | 2020-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629819892339 |
| OpenAlex | W3004050731 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 45 |
This article studies the role of subpoena power in enabling policymakers to make better-informed decisions. In particular, we take into account the effect of subpoena power on the information voluntarily supplied by interest groups as well as the information obtained by the policymaker via the subpoena process. To this end, we develop a model of informational lobbying in which interest groups seek access to the policymaker in order to provide him verifiable evidence about the desirability of implementing reforms they care about. The policymaker is access-constrained, that is, he lacks time/resources to scrutinize the evidence owned by all interest groups. The policymaker may also be agenda-constrained, that is, he may lack time/resources to reform all issues. We find that if a policymaker is agenda-constrained, then he is better off by having subpoena power. On the other hand, if a policymaker is not agenda-constrained, he can be worse off by having subpoena power. The key insight behind these findings is that subpoena power, while it increases the policymaker’s ability to acquire information from interest groups, it also alters the amount of information they voluntarily provide via lobbying, and that the net effect differs depending on whether or not the policymaker is agenda-constrained
Actuarial science · Business · Conflict of interest · Economics · Law and economics · Misrepresentation · Order (exchange · Political science · Power (physics · Public economics · Subpoena · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Finance
Gaining access
American business and public policy
Legislating in the Dark
Good News and Bad News
Bayesian Persuasion
Strategic Information Transmission
Quality Disclosure and Certification
Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
Foreign informational lobbying can enhance tourism
Lobbying and asymmetric information
Information, access, and contributions
Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information
Advocates
Money and Access
The Politics of Attention
Stovepiping
Information and Influence
Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials
Campaign Contributions and Access
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |