Stovepiping
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6297680 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sean Gailmard (0000-0002-1742-5879, University of California System), John W Patty (0000-0002-1142-9334, Department of Political Science, Center for New Institutional Social Sciences, Washington University in Saint Louis, St Louis, MO, USA) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 388-411 |
| Publication date | 2013-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629813477277 |
| OpenAlex | W4249418723 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
| References cited | 9 |
In hierarchical organizations lower-level agents can often censor the information that a higher-level principal has available to make a decision. We present a model of this interaction in which the principal can also access an independent source of unfiltered but lower-quality information besides that provided by the agent. This provision of outside information can be thought of as ‘stovepiping,’ the transmission of unfiltered information from analysts directly to decision-makers. Stovepiping can, in equilibrium, result in the agent passing along more information to the principal, precisely because the outsider’s information is of lower quality than the agent’s. But it can also lead the agent to ‘destroy’ information so that there is no basis for any policy change. Accordingly, stovepiping has countervailing effects on the principal’s utility. We discuss the comparative statics of equilibrium levels of information transmission with respect to the preferences of the principal, the outsider, and the probability that the outsider has access to the information held by the agent
Business · Comparative statics · Computer security · Economics · Information quality · Information system · Information transmission · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Principal (computer security · Principal–agent problem · Quality (philosophy · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
Conspiracies, Cover-Ups, Compartmentalization, and Containment
Policy devolution and cooperation dilemmas
Ambient politicization
The incentives of scientific experts
The Business of Governing Penang
Participation, process and policy
Signaling and Counter‐Signaling in the Judicial Hierarchy
Information and political institutions
Why participation? Institutions and inequality in urban politics
The process and perils of coming around
Approches formelles en transmission stratégique de l'information
Policy-Development Monopolies
Clarity or collaboration
Subpoena power and informational lobbying
Whistleblowing and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy
Competence and advice
Sound the Alarm? Judicial Decisions Regarding Publication and Dissent
I Don't Know
| Citations per year | 1.38 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Highly cited | No |