Hülya Eraslan
Biographic Data
| ID | 4386205 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hülya Eraslan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hülya |
| FAMILY NAME | Eraslan |
| SIGNATURE | ERASLAN H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9938-968X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Informational loss in bundled bargaining
We analyze a legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive issue. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological positions. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority-rule voting determines the outcome. We compare the outcome of the ‘bundled bargaining’ game in which the legislators negotiate over both issues together to that of the ‘separate bargaining’ game in which the legislators negot…
Bicameralism and Government Formation
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and stability of coalition governments. We then apply our methodology to estimate the effects of governmental bicameralism. Our main…
Bicameralism and Government Formation
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and stability of coalition governments. We then apply our methodology to estimate the effects of governmental bicameralism. Our main…
Informational loss in bundled bargaining
We analyze a legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive issue. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological positions. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority-rule voting determines the outcome. We compare the outcome of the ‘bundled bargaining’ game in which the legislators negotiate over both issues together to that of the ‘separate bargaining’ game in which the legislators negot…
Bicameralism and Government Formation
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and stability of coalition governments. We then apply our methodology to estimate the effects of governmental bicameralism. Our main…
Informational loss in bundled bargaining
We analyze a legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive issue. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological positions. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority-rule voting determines the outcome. We compare the outcome of the ‘bundled bargaining’ game in which the legislators negotiate over both issues together to that of the ‘separate bargaining’ game in which the legislators negot…
Economics (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Affect (linguistics (1 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Bargaining power (1 works) · Bargaining problem (1 works)