Bicameralism and Government Formation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12802458 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Diermeier (corresponding author), Hülya Eraslan (0000-0002-9938-968X), Antonio Merlo (0000-0002-4047-5604) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 227-252 |
| Publication date | 2007-08-13 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Quarterly Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1554-0626 • E-ISSN: 1554-0634 |
| Publisher | Now Publishers (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1561/100.00005004 |
| OpenAlex | W3124581438 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 29 |
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and stability of coalition governments. We then apply our methodology to estimate the effects of governmental bicameralism. Our main findings are that eliminating bicameralism does not affect government durability, but does have a significant effect on the composition of governments leading to smaller coalitions. These results are due to an equilibrium replacement effect: removing bicameralism affects the relative durability of coalitions of different sizes which in turn induces changes in the coalitions that are chosen in equilibrium
Affect (linguistics · Democracy · Durability · Economic system · Economics · Government (linguistics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Stability (learning theory · Computer Science · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
Does the winner take it all? Federal policies and political extremism
Stronger Veto, Less Fragmented Party Systems
Resiliente Demokratietypen. Eine vergleichende Analyse
Resilient patterns of democracy. A comparative analysis
Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities
Dynamic Approaches to Studying Parliamentary Coalitions
The Duration of Caretaker Periods and the Formation of Parliamentary Governments
Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation
Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies
Dying, surviving death, and reincarnating
Bicameralism Hinges on Legislative Professionalism
Elections and durable governments in parliamentary governments
Bicameralism and government formation
Institutional veto players and cabinet formation
Coalition Presidentialism in Bicameral Congresses
A Coalescência Revisitada
Democracies
Bicameralism
Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
Veto Players
Economic Dynamics and Government Stability in Postwar Italy
Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment
Institutionalism as a Methodology
Veto Players and Institutional Analysis
An “Events” Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability
The Importance of Concurrence
A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions
A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections
Coalitions and Cabinet Government
Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies
Government Formation and Endogenous Parties
Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events
A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems
Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,84 |
| Citation span | 2007 - 2026 (20) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 16 |