Antonio Merlo
Biographic Data
| ID | 5871769 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Antonio Merlo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Antonio |
| FAMILY NAME | Merlo |
| SIGNATURE | MERLO A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pennsylvania |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4047-5604 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 42 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Political Economy and Policy Analysis
Most of economics takes politics for granted. Through some (often implausible) assumptions, it seeks to explain away political structures by characterizing them as stable and predictable or as inconsequential in understanding what goes on in an economy. Such attempts are misguided, and this book shows how governments and political institutions are composed of people who respond to incentives and whose behavior and choices can be studied through t…
External validation of voter turnout models by concealed parameter recovery
The Ruling Class
The ruling class plays a major role in our societies. It makes possible what would otherwise be infeasible, by shifting out those constraints that stand in the way of long-term growth. Historically, economists devoted far less attention than sociologists to the study of ruling classes. Using the theoretical tools of economists, this book provides an understanding of what drives the formation of a ruling class, and the relationship between politic…
Political careers or career politicians?
Bicameralism and Government Formation
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and stability of coalition governments. We then apply our methodology to estimate the effects of governmental bicameralism. Our main…
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress andestimate this model using a newly collected dataset. Given estimates of the structural model, we assess reelection probabilities, estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages, and quantify the value of a congressional seat. Moreover, we assess how an inc…
Bargaining over residential real estate: Evidence from England
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
Economic Dynamics and Government Stability in Postwar Italy
In this paper I estimate a duration model of the Italian government. The main finding of the paper is that the downfall probability of an Italian government depends on both political and economic factors. In particular, the higher the inflation rate and the higher the number of workhours lost in strikes both at the time a government forms and during its tenure in office, the more likely it is for a government to collapse. This result has importan…
Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment
In this paper, I structurally estimate a stochastic bargaining model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy, and I conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. I show that the model fits well data on the duration of negotiations and government durations in postwar Italy. Also, I show that changes in the proposer selection process would not affect either the duration of negotia…
Bargaining over residential real estate: Evidence from England
Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment
In this paper, I structurally estimate a stochastic bargaining model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy, and I conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. I show that the model fits well data on the duration of negotiations and government durations in postwar Italy. Also, I show that changes in the proposer selection process would not affect either the duration of negotia…
Bicameralism and Government Formation
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and stability of coalition governments. We then apply our methodology to estimate the effects of governmental bicameralism. Our main…
External validation of voter turnout models by concealed parameter recovery
Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment
In this paper, I structurally estimate a stochastic bargaining model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy, and I conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. I show that the model fits well data on the duration of negotiations and government durations in postwar Italy. Also, I show that changes in the proposer selection process would not affect either the duration of negotia…
Economic Dynamics and Government Stability in Postwar Italy
In this paper I estimate a duration model of the Italian government. The main finding of the paper is that the downfall probability of an Italian government depends on both political and economic factors. In particular, the higher the inflation rate and the higher the number of workhours lost in strikes both at the time a government forms and during its tenure in office, the more likely it is for a government to collapse. This result has importan…
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
Bargaining over residential real estate: Evidence from England
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress andestimate this model using a newly collected dataset. Given estimates of the structural model, we assess reelection probabilities, estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages, and quantify the value of a congressional seat. Moreover, we assess how an inc…
Bicameralism and Government Formation
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and stability of coalition governments. We then apply our methodology to estimate the effects of governmental bicameralism. Our main…
Political careers or career politicians?
The Ruling Class
The ruling class plays a major role in our societies. It makes possible what would otherwise be infeasible, by shifting out those constraints that stand in the way of long-term growth. Historically, economists devoted far less attention than sociologists to the study of ruling classes. Using the theoretical tools of economists, this book provides an understanding of what drives the formation of a ruling class, and the relationship between politic…
Political Economy and Policy Analysis
Most of economics takes politics for granted. Through some (often implausible) assumptions, it seeks to explain away political structures by characterizing them as stable and predictable or as inconsequential in understanding what goes on in an economy. Such attempts are misguided, and this book shows how governments and political institutions are composed of people who respond to incentives and whose behavior and choices can be studied through t…
External validation of voter turnout models by concealed parameter recovery
Economics (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Law (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (3 works)